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	 The	increased	adoption	of	electric	vehicles	by	consumers	is	likely	in	the	near	future,	and	
currently	lithium-ion	batteries	are	the	preeminent	technology	for	electric	vehicles,	such	as	
those	manufactured	by	Tesla.	Given	this	scenario,	it	is	also	likely	that	the	extraction	of	lithium	
will	rise	in	the	future	and	certain	countries	may	benefit	from	this	increased	extraction.	Bolivia	is	
one	of	these	countries	as	it	has	one	of	the	world’s	largest	deposits	of	lithium.	However,	it	is	
readily	apparent	that	natural	resource	extraction	can	also	come	with	unique	and	significant	
challenges,	and	many	governments	have	failed	to	properly	manage	their	natural	resource	
wealth.	Therefore,	my	thesis	question	is,	how	should	the	national	government	of	Bolivia	best	
manage	the	extraction	of	its	lithium	deposits?	Drawing	upon	the	Natural	Resource	Charter,	I	
systematically	examine	the	Bolivian	government’s	ability	to	do	so,	and	I	identify	particular	
challenges	towards	natural	resource	governance	that	the	national	government	faces.	I	conclude	
by	summing	these	challenges	and	by	offering	recommendations	for	these	particular	issues.		
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I.	Introduction	
Green,	renewable,	clean,	sustainable,	this	lexicon	of	buzzwords	paints	a	promising	
picture	for	many	and	is	closely	associated	with	climate	change	and	the	emergence	of	new	
energy	sources	like	wind	or	solar.	Likewise,	the	introduction	of	novel	technologies	ranging	from	
self-driving	cars	to	virtual	reality	headsets	by	the	likes	of	Google,	SpaceX	and	a	host	of	other	
corporations	receives	a	considerable	amount	of	press	and	attention	today.	The	merging	of	
these	two	ideas	is	reflected	by	the	electric	and	self-driving	car	manufacturer	Tesla	briefly	
passing	G.M.	as	America’s	most	valuable	auto	company	on	the	basis	of	future	prospects	rather	
than	current	profits.1	This	nascent	world	of	new	technologies	and	alternative	sources	of	energy	
reported	in	the	news	and	on	the	minds	of	many	perhaps	may	overlook	some	of	the	practical	
concerns	of	their	adoption.	Wind	turbines,	electric	vehicles,	solar	cells	and	energy-efficient	
lighting	are	all	dependent	upon	components	manufactured	with	certain	rare	earth	metals	or	
other	key	materials	that	make	these	technologies	possible.2	The	emergence	of	these	new	
technologies	will	require	the	increased	extraction	of	certain	natural	resources.	
This	observation	leads	to	another,	which	is	that	countries	rich	in	oil,	gas	and	minerals	
can	face	unique	and	significant	social,	economic	and	political	challenges;	This	is	sometimes	
referred	to	as	the	resource	curse.3	For	instance,	“many	oil-,	gas-	and	mineral-rich	countries	
have	failed	to	reach	their	full	potential	as	a	result	of	their	natural	resource	wealth”	and	that	“in	
                                                
1	Vlasic,	Bill.	"G.M.	Takes	a	Back	Seat	to	Tesla	as	America’s	Most	Valued	Carmaker."	April	10,	2017.	
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/business/general-motors-stock-valuation.html.	
2	"Critical	Materials	Strategy."	November	2011.	
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnx0YWN0aWNhbGVhcnRofGd4OjVi
ZjEwZGQ3ZmE3Yzg1YQ.	
3	"The	Resource	Curse."	March	2015.	http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_Resource-
Curse.pdf. 
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general,	they	are	also	more	authoritarian,	more	prone	to	conflict,	and	less	economically	stable	
than	countries	without	these	resources.”4	To	mitigate	these	negative	effects,	there	are	
frameworks,	best	practices,	and	extensive	literatures	that	suggest	how	to	best	manage	the	
extraction	of	natural	resources.	Therefore,	while	there	could	be	a	net	benefit	from	the	adoption	
of	new	technologies	like	electric	cars	or	solar	panels,	a	critical	analysis	of	the	effects	of	this	
increased	natural	resource	extraction	should	still	occur	given	the	possible	ramifications.			
This	thesis	is	the	pairing	of	these	two	observations.	Firstly,	the	increased	adoption	of	
electric	vehicles	in	the	near	future	is	likely,	and	lithium-ion	battery	electric	vehicles	are	
currently	the	preeminent	technology.	The	adoption	of	electric	cars	will	therefore	require	the	
increased	extraction	of	lithium	and	countries	with	large	resource	bases	of	lithium	could	possibly	
stand	to	benefit	significantly	in	the	future.	A	country	that	has	garnered	large	amounts	of	
attention	for	its	base	of	lithium	is	Bolivia	and	it	is	in	the	process	of	attempting	to	utilize	this	
resource.	Therefore,	my	thesis	question	is,	how	should	the	national	government	of	Bolivia	best	
manage	the	extraction	of	its	lithium	deposits?	
Following	this	introduction,	a	discussion	of	electric	cars	and	their	future	adoption	will	
take	place.	This	thesis	argues	again	that	the	increased	adoption	of	battery	electric	vehicles	is	
highly	likely	and	that	the	increased	extraction	of	lithium	will	occur.	This	is	termed	“the	
scenario”	in	this	thesis	and	is	the	basis	for	a	holistic	analysis	of	Bolivia	and	its	deposits	of	
lithium.	I	then	move	on	to	a	discussion	of	lithium	extraction	particularly	within	Bolivia	and	at	
the	Salar	de	Uyuni.	I	discuss	the	current	status	of	this	lithium	project	and	also	the	quality	of	the	
Salar	de	Uyuni’s	lithium	deposits.		
                                                
4	Ibid.		
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Next,	I	move	on	to	a	general	discussion	of	natural	resource	governance.	I	discuss	the	
difficulties	inherent	in	the	governance	of	these	resources	and	the	ways	in	which	they	can	
provoke	conflict	or	challenge	a	country.	I	then	discuss	a	framework	that	offers	best	practices	
and	solutions	to	these	challenges,	the	Natural	Resource	Charter.	The	Natural	Resource	Charter	
is	the	theoretical	underpinning	of	the	meat	of	this	thesis,	which	is	the	application	stage.	I	
specifically	apply	the	Natural	Resource	Charter	and	its	various	guidelines	and	precepts	to	Bolivia	
and	its	lithium	project.	
The	first	section	of	the	charter	is	concerned	with	domestic	foundations	for	resource	
governance,	and	this	deals	with	a	country’s	national	strategy	in	context	of	natural	resources	
and	its	institutions.	Here,	I	also	discuss	Bolivia’s	national	developmental	plan,	which	has	been	
deemed	“neoextractivist”	by	other	authors.	I	also	pay	attention	to	the	challenge	corruption	
within	the	Bolivian	national	government	poses,	and	I	conclude	the	section	by	discussing	
Bolivia’s	civil	society	and	the	public’s	access	to	information	about	extractive	industries.		
The	second	section	of	the	charter	discusses	efficient	exploration	and	production	
operations,	as	well	as	the	allocation	of	rights.	I	discuss	property	rights	in	context	of	the	Salar	de	
Uyuni	and	also	indigenous	rights.	I	critique	the	state’s	understanding	of	its	lithium	resources	
and	also	its	methodology	for	partnering	with	foreign	corporations.		
The	next	section,	A	Good	Deal,	is	almost	entirely	concerned	with	the	local	effects	of	
lithium	extraction,	particularly	in	regards	to	the	environment	as	well	as	people’s	livelihoods.	I	
also	discuss	efforts	that	the	Bolivian	national	government	has	taken	to	consult	with	local	groups	
and	individuals	who	may	be	affected	by	this	project.	I	also	examine	tourism,	quinoa	production,	
and	Bolivia’s	legal	frameworks	in	context	of	the	negative	effects	of	lithium	extraction.	This	
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section	is	one	of	the	most	important	towards	determining	the	ability	of	the	national	
government	to	manage	this	resource	well.		
Following	this	section,	I	analyze	the	state’	ability	to	manage	revenues	gained	from	
national	resource	extraction.	Here,	I	look	to	Bolivia’s	hydrocarbons	sector	as	a	source	of	
analysis	and	conclude	that	the	country	appears	to	use	its	revenues	for	the	wellbeing	of	its	
citizens.	The	national	government	has	also	accounted	for	the	volatility	in	price	of	hydrocarbons	
well	by	building	up	its	fiscal	reserves.	I	argue	that	the	Bolivian	government	could	manage	
lithium	revenues	well	but	that	it	also	has	room	for	improvement.	
The	next	section,	called	Sustainable	Development,	considers	the	use	of	revenues	to	
diversify	and	benefit	the	economy	through	effective	public	spending.	I	suggest	here	challenges	
to	the	government’s	ability	to	effectively	manage	its	public	spending	programs.	I	also	argue	that	
the	Bolivian	national	government	is	looking	to	diversify	the	economy	and	to	bring	in	private	
investment	in	the	near	future.	
Finally,	I	conclude	by	discussing	how	international	organizations,	private	sector	
companies,	and	governments	can	interact	and	uphold	high	environmental,	social	and	human	
rights	standards.	I	examine	the	standards	that	the	Bolivian	national	government	maintains.	This	
section	is	brief	in	comparison	and	mostly	proposes	that	the	Bolivian	government	should	
interact	with	international	organizations	to	not	only	support	sustainable	development	but	to	
reach	the	heights	of	these	standards.	This	concludes	the	application	stage	of	my	thesis.		
The	last	section	is	Recommendations.	This	is	the	conclusion	of	the	thesis	and	it	functions	
as	an	opportunity	for	me	to	discuss	the	challenges	that	the	Bolivian	state	faces	in	developing	
the	industrial	production	of	lithium.	This	section	coalesces	my	findings	from	the	application	of	
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the	Natural	Resource	Charter	into	a	comprehensive	narrative.	I	also	state	ways	in	which	the	
national	government	can	better	manage	its	governance	of	the	lithium	project.	Now,	I	will	move	
on	to	an	in-depth	discussion	of	electric	vehicles	and	their	potential	adoption.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 9	
II.	The	Scenario	
A.	Electric	Cars	and	Lithium	
	 For	years,	the	paradigm	for	automobile	manufacturers	has	stayed	relatively	the	same.	
Yet,	the	traditional	notion	of	what	an	automobile	is	seems	to	be	evolving	as	technological	
achievements	like	self-driving	capabilities	or	battery	electric	vehicles	(BEVs)	become	more	and	
more	commonplace.	In	2005,	there	existed	only	hundreds	of	electric	cars	but,	just	10	years	
later,	the	global	number	of	electric	cars	on	the	road	closed	at	1.26	million	in	the	year	2015.5	
Battery	electric	vehicles	have	gone	from	gimmicks	to	daily	drivers	for	a	significant	amount	of	
the	populace	and	companies	like	Tesla	are	receiving	significant	amounts	of	press	and	attention.	
Reservations	for	Tesla’s	Model	3	at	refundable	deposit	of	$1,000	are	now	approaching	400,000	
for	the	actual	launch	of	a	product	that	has	yet	to	occur.6	In	short,	the	automobile	of	today	could	
very	well	change	into	a	significantly	different	vehicle	over	the	coming	years.	Battery-electric	
vehicles	specifically	could	gain	a	significant	portion	of	the	market	share	as	they	become	
increasingly	affordable	and,	paired	with	a	decarbonized	electric	grid,	could	become	one	major	
factor	in	mitigating	climate	change.		
Electric	vehicles	in	particular	have	been	identified	as	being	a	partial	solution	to	climate	
change.	International	conferences	such	as	the	21st	Conference	of	the	Parties	to	the	United	
Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC),	which	was	held	in	Paris	in	
December	of	2015,	affirmed	the	need	for	electric	vehicles	when	the	objective	to	limit	the	global	
                                                
5	"Global	EV	Outlook	2016."	International	Energy	Agency,	2016.	Web.	2	Feb.	2017.	
<https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Global_EV_Outlook_2016.pdf>.	
6	Fehrenbacher,	Katie.	"Tesla's	Model	3	Reservations	Rise	to	Almost	400,000."	April	15,	2016.	
http://fortune.com/2016/04/15/tesla-model-3-reservations-400000/.	
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average	temperature	increase	well	below	2°C	was	set.7	For	greenhouse	gas	emissions	(GHG)	to	
be	reduced	so	as	to	limit	global	warming	to	less	than	this	2°C	target,	the	global	transport	sector	
would	need	to	change	significantly.	The	“transport	sector	accounts	for	about	a	quarter	(23%)	of	
global	energy-related	GHG	emissions”	and	the	“ambitious	GHG	emissions	reduction	required	to	
limit	global	warming	to	less	than	2˚C	is	unlikely	to	be	achievable	without	a	major	contribution	
from	the	transport	sector.”8	Additionally,	greenhouse	gas	emissions	from	transport	are	
expected	to	“rise	from	today’s	levels	by	nearly	20	percent	by	2030	and	close	to	50	percent	by	
year	2050	unless	major	action	is	undertaken.”9	Therefore,	the	International	Energy	Agency	
suggests	that	at	least	20	percent	of	all	road	transport	vehicles	globally	need	to	be	electrically	
driven	by	2030	to	meet	this	2˚C	target.10	General	efforts	by	states	to	mitigate	climate	change	
could	provide	one	impetus	for	electric	cars	to	become	increasingly	popular.	However,	the	
general	affordability	of	battery	electric	vehicles	could	be	a	major	factor	as	well.			
The	success	of	battery	electric	vehicles	also	hinges	upon	their	relative	cost	to	internal	
combustion	vehicles.11	The	key	difference	in	design	and	cost	between	battery	electric	vehicles	
and	internal	combustion	vehicles	is	the	power	train	and	in	particular	the	battery.12	However,	
the	true	cost	of	lithium-ion	(Li-ion)	batteries,	which	is	the	dominating	technology	today,	is	
difficult	to	ascertain	because	it	is	a	secret	closely	held	by	manufacturers.13	In	Rapidly	falling	
                                                
7	Global	EV	Outlook	2016.	
8	Ibid.		
9	"Paris	Declaration	on	Electro-Mobility	and	Climate	Change	&	Call	to	Action."	2015.	Accessed	February	3,	2017.	
http://www.iea.org/media/workshops/2015/transportworkshopatcop/pariselectromobilitydeclaration.pdf.	
10	Ibid.		
11Nykvist,	B.,	&	Nilsson,	M.	(2015).	Rapidly	falling	costs	of	battery	packs	for	electric	vehicles.	Nature	Climate	
Change,	5(4),	329-332.	doi:http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/10.1038/nclimate2564 
12	Ibid.		
13	Orcutt,	Mike.	"Inexpensive	Electric	Cars	May	Arrive	Sooner	Than	You	Think."	MIT	Technology	Review.	N.p.,	02	
Apr.	2015.	Web.	2	Feb.	2017.	<https://www.technologyreview.com/s/536336/inexpensive-electric-cars-may-
arrive-sooner-than-you-think/>.	kWh	is	an	abbreviation	of	kilowatt-hour,	a	unit	of	energy.		
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costs	of	battery	packs	for	electric	vehicles	the	authors	systematically	reviewed	over	80	
estimates	reported	from	2007-2014	so	as	to	estimate	the	costs	of	Li-ion	battery	packs	for	BEV	
manufacturers;	Ultimately,	“industry-wide	cost	estimates	declined	by	approximately	14%	
annually	between	2007	and	2014,	from	above	US$1,000	per	kWh	to	around	US$410	per	kWh,	
and	the	cost	of	battery	packs	used	by	market-leading	BEV	manufacturers	are	even	lower,	at	
US$300	per	kWh,	and	has	declined	by	8%	annually.”14	These	findings	have	significant	
implications	for	the	future	because	they	suggest	that	BEV’s	could	contribute	to	low-carbon	
transport	through	increasing	affordability.		
Today,	battery	electric	vehicle	sales	are	taking	off,	although	they	are	still	a	niche	product	
among	early	adopters;	Along	with	lower	battery	costs,	“important	explanatory	factors	behind	
this	takeoff	include	public	incentive	schemes,	and	the	local	or	regional	presence	of	charging	
infrastructure	and	national	manufacturers”.15	In	the	near	term,	battery	costs	“are	driven	by	cell	
manufacturing	improvements,	learning	rates	for	pack	integration	and	capturing	increasing	
economies	of	scale.”	If	BEV	sales	continue	to	sustain	strong	growth	for	a	few	years,	it	is	possible	
that	economies	of	scale	will	push	costs	of	battery	packs	towards	US$200	per	kWh	in	the	near	
future	even	without	cell	chemistry	improvements.16	Tesla’s	Gigafactory	is	an	example	of	
economies	of	scale	as	the	company	seeks	to	double	the	world’s	production	capacity	for	lithium-
ion	batteries	by	2018.17	The	authors	suggest	that	“there	is	a	convergence	of	estimates	of	
                                                
14	Nykvist,	B.,	&	Nilsson,	M.		
15	Ibid.		
16	Ibid.		
17	Randall,	Tom.	"Tesla	Flips	the	Switch	on	the	Gigafactory."	January	04,	2017.	
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-04/tesla-flips-the-switch-on-the-gigafactory.	
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battery	cost	for	the	whole	industry	and	costs	for	market-leading	car	manufacturers	in	2017-
2018	at	around	US$230	kWh.”18		
This	trend	is	especially	important	when	looking	at	the	relative	cost	between	battery	
electric	vehicles	and	traditional	internal	combustion	vehicles.	As	the	authors	point	out,	“it	is	
commonly	understood	that	the	cost	of	battery	packs	needs	to	fall	below	US$150	per	kWh	in	
order	for	BEVs	to	become	cost-competitive	on	par	with	internal	combustion	vehicles.”19	If	costs	
“reach	as	low	as	US$150	per	kWh	this	means	that	electric	vehicles	will	probably	move	beyond	
niche	applications	and	begin	to	penetrate	the	market	widely,	leading	to	a	potential	paradigm	
shift	in	vehicle	technology.”20	While	there	are	large	uncertainties	on	past,	current,	and	future	
costs	of	LI-ion	battery	packs,	costs	ultimately	are	continuing	to	decline.21		
In	all,	varying	reports	exist	to	the	extent	to	which	electric	vehicles	will	enter	the	
marketplace,	because	it	is	difficult	to	predict	how	the	costs	of	energy	technologies	will	fall,	and	
it	is	also	difficult	to	forecast	oil	prices.22	For	instance,	the	article	above	presents	a	scenario	
where	costs	could	continue	to	decline,	without	a	significant	technological	breakthrough.	On	the	
other	hand,	the	Organization	of	Petroleum	Exporting	Countries	(OPEC)	declared	that	electric	
vehicles	“are	not	expected	to	gain	significant	market	share	in	the	foreseeable	future”	without	a	
technological	breakthrough.23	I	am	arguing	that	the	scenario	where	battery	electric	vehicles	
becoming	increasingly	popular	and	affordable	in	the	near	future	is	not	only	possible	but	likely.	
                                                
18	Nykvist,	B.,	&	Nilsson,	M	
19	Ibid.		
20	Ibid.		
21	Ibid.		
22	Orcutt,	Mike.	"The	2020s	Could	Be	the	Decade	When	Electric	Cars	Take	Over."	MIT	Technology	Review.	February	
26,	2016.	Accessed	February	03,	2017.	https://www.technologyreview.com/s/600910/the-2020s-could-be-the-
decade-when-electric-cars-take-over/.	
23	Ibid.		
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This	distinct	possibility	warrants	attention	because	of	its	implications	for	areas	in	the	world	that	
have	large	deposits	of	the	natural	resources	that	make	battery	electric	vehicles	possible.	
Lithium	is	one	of	these	natural	resources,	as	lithium-ion	batteries	are	the	dominating	
technology	for	battery	electric	vehicles.	Therefore,	the	possibly	increasing	affordability	of	
battery	electric	vehicles	along	with	their	use	in	mitigating	climate	change	may	make	the	future	
extraction	of	lithium	much	higher	than	it	is	today.	Grid	storage	using	lithium-ion	batteries	could	
also	impact	the	lithium	market	and	increase	demand;	however,	this	recent	phenomenon	has	
not	been	accounted	for	in	terms	of	both	adoption	and	the	impact	it	could	have	on	the	
extraction	of	lithium.			
The	global	lithium	production	in	2014	reached	roughly	170,000	t	lithium	carbonate	
equivalents	(LCE).	By	2020,	and	it	is	possible	that	lithium	demand	will	increase	to	between	
230,000	t/a	LCE	and	270,000	t/a	LCE.24	Likewise,	the	price	for	lithium	carbonate	amounted	to	
7,200	USD/t	in	September	of	2016,	but	some	estimates	see	a	price	jump	to	25,500	USD/t	no	
later	than	2020.25	Beyond	2020,	it	is	difficult	to	find	a	reliable	forecast	of	the	lithium	market	
given	that	the	battery	market	depends	on	partially	on	political	decisions,	raw	materials,	and	
new	battery	technologies.26	It	is	therefore	difficult	to	state	or	project	accurately	just	how	large	
or	valuable	the	global	lithium	market	could	be,	given	that	it	is	dependent	on	other	factors	like	
the	adoption	of	electric	cars.	The	current	lithium	market	is	dominated	by	a	small	number	of	
corporations.	In	2015,	four	companies	provided	88	percent	of	the	world’s	lithium	but	now	a	
                                                
24	Martin,	Gunther,	Lars	Rentsch,	Michael	Höck,	and	Martin	Bertau.	"Lithium	market	research	–	global	supply,	
future	demand	and	price	development."	Energy	Storage	Materials	6	(2017):	171-79.	
doi:10.1016/j.ensm.2016.11.004.	
25	Ibid.		 	
26	Ibid.		
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host	of	other	companies	are	seeking	to	capture	shares	of	the	market	as	demand	has	grown.27	
One	of	these	companies,	FMC	Corporation,	reported	$264	million	in	segment	revenue	and	full-
year	segment	earnings	were	$70	million	for	FMC	Lithium.	Additionally,	FMC	Lithium	expects	its	
2017	segment	revenue	to	be	approximately	between	$315	million	to	$355	million,	with	full-
year	segment	earnings	expected	to	be	between	$90	million	and	$110	million.28	It	is	also	
important	to	note	that	just	as	there	are	a	small	number	of	corporations	involved	in	the	
extraction	of	lithium	there	are	also	a	small	number	of	countries	with	meaningful	lithium	
deposits.	60%	of	global	lithium	resources	can	be	found	in	South	America,	especially	Chile,	
Bolivia,	and	Argentina,	which	are	sometimes	called	the	“lithium	triangle”.29	Bolivia	is	also	
unique	among	Chile	and	Argentina	in	that	it	has	one	of	the	largest	deposits	of	lithium	in	the	
world	and	that	this	resource	base	has	not	yet	been	utilized.	The	creation	of	an	industrial-scale	
lithium	production	operation	is	currently	ongoing	in	Bolivia.		
	
B.	Lithium	in	Bolivia		
Bolivia	was	labeled	by	many	as	the	“Saudi	Arabia	of	lithium”	by	the	end	of	2008,	after	
the	country	appeared	to	have	a	privileged	place	in	the	evolving	lithium	market.30	In	the	popular	
press,	Bolivia’s	massive	salt	flat,	the	Salar	de	Uyuni,	was	determined	to	be	the	largest	lithium	
                                                
27	Tullis,	Paul.	"The	Great	Nevada	Lithium	Rush	to	Fuel	the	New	Economy."	March	29,	2017.	
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-03-29/the-great-nevada-lithium-rush-to-fuel-the-new-
economy.	
28	"FMC	Corporation	Announces	Fourth	Quarter	and	Full	Year	2016	Results."	February	6,	2017.	
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=117919&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=2243425.	
29	Martin,	et	al. 	
30	Mares,	David	R.	"Lithium	in	Bolivia:	Can	Resource	Nationalism	Deliver	for	Bolivians	and	the	World?."	(2010)	
http://bakerinstitute.org/research/lithium-in-bolivia-can-resource-nationalism-deliver-for-bolivians-and-the-
world/.	
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deposit	in	the	world.31	However,	there	are	varying	reports	as	to	how	large	Bolivia’s	lithium	
reserves	actually	are.	The	Bolivian	government,	through	its	state	owned	Corporación	Minera	de	
Bolivia	(COMIBOL),	has	stated	that	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	has	very	large	in	situ	resources	of	350	Mt	
of	lithium.32	More	recently,	the	government	estimated	that	Bolivia	stores	around	70%	of	the	
world’s	lithium	reserves,	some	100	million	metric	tonnes.33	More	conservative	estimates	put	
Bolivia’s	lithium	reserves	between	0.6	and	9.0	Mt.34	In	January	of	2010,	the	U.S	Geological	
Survey	also	identified	lithium	resources	for	Bolivia	at	9	million	tonnes	but	the	global	identified	
lithium	resources	were	only	22.5	million	tonnes.35	The	total	for	globally	identified	lithium	
resources	has	evolved	in	recent	years.	The	U.S	Geological	Survey	recently	estimated	that	
Bolivia’s	identified	lithium	resources	to	be	9	million	tons	out	of	a	global	total	of	40.7	million	
tons.36	The	consensus,	while	perhaps	not	as	high	as	the	Bolivian	government	would	like,	
appears	to	be	that	Bolivia	does	currently	contain	the	largest	identified	lithium	resource	base,	
but	its	overall	percentage	of	the	world’s	supply	has	dropped	dramatically.			
	 However,	lithium	production	is	not	dependent	on	just	having	the	resource	in	absolute	
terms.	Lithium	brine	deposits	“have	several	key	geologic	and/or	geographic	characteristics	such	
as	lithium	grade,	the	magnesium	to	lithium	ratio,	and	the	evaporation	rate.	Higher	grades	of	
                                                
31	Gruber,	Paul,	and	Pablo	Medina.	"Global	Lithium	Availability:	A	Constraint	for	Electric	Vehicles?"	Center	for	
Sustainable	Systems.	April	2010.	Accessed	December	07,	2016.	
http://css.snre.umich.edu/sites/default/files/css_doc/CSS10-05.pdf.		
32	Mohr,	Steve	H.;	Mudd,	Gavin	M.;	Giurco,	Damien.	2012.	"Lithium	Resources	and	Production:	Critical	Assessment	
and	Global	Projections."	Minerals	2,	no.	1:	65-84.	
33	López,	Rafael	Sagárnaga.	"Bolivia's	Lithium	Boom:	Dream	or	Nightmare?"	OpenDemocracy.	December	21,	2015.	
Accessed	December	07,	2016.	https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/rafael-sag-rnaga-l-pez/bolivia-
s-lithium-boom-dream-or-nightmare.		
34	Gruber,	Paul,	and	Pablo	Medina.	
35	"Lithium."	Mineral	Commodity	Summaries.	January	2010.	
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/lithium/mcs-2010-lithi.pdf.		 
36	"Lithium."	Mineral	Commodity	Summaries.	January	2016.	
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/lithium/mcs-2016-lithi.pdf.		
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lithium	and	higher	evaporation	rates	decrease	the	amount	of	time	the	brines	have	to	be	in	
evaporation	ponds.	Finally,	lower	magnesium	to	lithium	ratios	reduce	the	cost	of	production,	as	
lower	ratios	make	it	easier	to	separate	the	magnesium	from	the	lithium.”37	
Ultimately,	“the	quality	of	Bolivian	lithium	deposits	is	a	key	concern	because	it	affects	
the	cost	of	extracting	the	lithium	from	the	brine	and	processing	it	into	lithium	carbonate.	The	
brine	under	the	Salar	has	low	concentrations	of	lithium,	thereby	requiring	more	drilling	and	
channeling	to	accumulate	the	lithium	in	quantities	desired.”38	Additionally,	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	
“has	significantly	high	ratios	of	magnesium	to	lithium	(compare	18.6:1	to	Chile’s	Salar	de	
Atacama	at	6.5:1	or	the	Argentine	Salar	de	Hombre	Muerto	at	1.5:1),	requiring	more	expensive	
extraction	and	processing	to	generate	lithium	carbonate.”39	The	Salar	de	Uyuni	also	experiences	
seasonal	flooding	of	the	salt	flats	which	“slows	the	overall	evaporative	process	in	the	pools	
relative	to	the	evaporation	rate	at	competing	sites	and	thus	contributes	to	higher	costs.”40	One	
solution,	which	would	extend	the	evaporation	process	to	eight-to-ten	months,	would	involve	
the	construction	of	a	circuit	of	evaporation	ponds.41	Finally,	the	relative	harshness	and	isolation	
of	the	region	also	poses	issues	towards	development	because	of	infrastructure	issues.42	
	 A	pilot	operation	in	2009	was	initiated	in	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	“to	determine	the	technical	
and	economic	feasibility	of	mining	and	refining	the	lithium-rich	brine”.	This	state	owned	
operation	is	operated	by	the	General	Directorate	of	Evaporative	Resources	of	the	Salar	de	
                                                
37	Mohr,	Steve	H.;	Mudd,	Gavin	M.;	Giurco,	Damien.	2012.	
38	Mares,	David	R.	
39	Ibid.			
40	Ibid.		
41	Mccormick,	Myles.	"Bolivia	Brimming	with	Lithium	Ambition."	Industrial	Minerals.	August	18,	2016.	Accessed	
December	07,	2016.	http://www.indmin.com/Article/3578858/Bolivia-brimming-with-lithium-ambition.html	
42	Mares,	David	R.	
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Uyuni,	under	the	state	mining	company	COMIBOL.	A	number	of	corporations	have	also	
attempted	to	gain	access	to	Bolivia’s	lithium;	in	years	past,	both	South	Korea’s	Posco	and	
France’s	Eramet	have	attempted	to	partner	with	the	state	but	neither	succeeded.43	As	far	back	
as	the	1990s	lithium	extraction	has	been	a	possibility.	Then,	“the	campesinos	in	the	area	
repeatedly	petitioned	the	government	to	mine	the	Salar,	and	in	1990	President	Jaime	Paz	
Zamora	agreed,	in	principle,	to	a	multiyear	contract	with	the	Lithium	Corporation	of	America	
(now	F.M.C.	Corporation),	which	would	have	allowed	the	company	to	take	all	the	lithium	it	
could,	giving	Bolivia	only	eight	per	cent	of	the	profits.”44	The	campesinos	then	launched	a	
campaign	against	it	as	many	Bolivians	were	outraged	over	the	deal.45	
Recently,	after	years	of	hopeful	rhetoric	and	stunted	progress,	it	seems	that	more	
significant	progress	has	been	made	towards	a	lithium	industry	in	Bolivia.	The	Gerencia	Nacional	
de	Recursos	Evaporícitos	(GNRE),	a	wing	of	Bolivia’s	mining	body	COMIBOL,	announced	that	the	
country	had	sold	9.3	tonnes	of	lithium	carbonate	to	China	Machinery	Engineering	Corp;	This	
moment	marked	Bolivia’s	symbolic	entry	onto	the	international	lithium	market,	given	that	the	
lithium	carbonate	was	produced	solely	by	the	pilot	plant	and	98%	lithium	carbonate	sells	at	
$7,000	per	tonne.46	Another	pilot	volume	of	16	tonnes	is	supposed	to	follow	this	initial	
material.47	Besides	these	initial	productions	of	lithium	carbonate,	more	significant	plans	for	
extracting	the	lithium	in	the	Salar	have	emerged.		
                                                
43	Mccormick,	Myles.		
44	Wright,	Lawrence.	"Lithium	Dreams."	The	New	Yorker.	March	22,	2015.	
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/03/22/lithium-dreams.	
45	Ibid.		
46	Mccormick,	Myles.		
47	Ibid.		
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Bolivia,	in	August	of	2016,	“signed	a	contract	with	German	company	K-UTEC	Ag	Salt	
Technologies	to	design	a	lithium	carbonate	plant”	that	would	be	a	full	scale,	30,000	tonnes	per	
annum	industrial	plant.	Heiner	Marx,	CEO	of	K-UTEC,	reported	that	the	project	design	will	be	
finished	by	September	and	basic	engineering	works	would	be	completed	by	March;	Then	the	
GNRE	will	“put	the	installation,	assembly	and	commissioning	of	the	facility	out	to	tender	
(though	the	state	will	keep	full	control	of	the	product).”48	The	completion	date	of	K-UTEC’s	
project	design	was	pushed	to	the	first	quarter	of	2017,	due	to	the	need	to	modify	the	brine	
extraction	process	given	the	large	volumes	of	magnesium	present.49	China’s	Linyi	Dake	Trade	
also	constructed	an	ion	lithium	battery	pilot	plant	in	2014	at	the	same	site.50	Finally,	another	
Chinese	company,	CAMC	Engineering	signed	a	contract	to	construct	a	potassium	salt	industrial	
plant.	In	the	wake	of	these	announcements,	Bolivia’s	vice	president,	Álvaro	García	Linera,	
“spoke	of	the	country’s	lithium	resources	becoming	‘the	fuel	that	will	feed	the	world’	and	said	
that	this	would	drive	Bolivia	to	become	a	continental	powerhouse	by	2025.”51	Throughout	the	
past	decade,	this	nascent	dream	of	lithium	has	been	at	the	forefront	of	discussions	by	the	state	
as	well	as	local	peoples	that	live	by	the	Salar	de	Uyuni.	The	next	section	of	this	thesis	discusses	
the	extraction	of	natural	resources	broadly	and	then	moves	on	to	a	discussion	of	natural	
resource	governance	in	the	context	of	lithium.		
	
                                                
48	Ibid.		
49	Ibid.	
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III.	Natural	Resource	Governance	
	 Extractive	resources,	whether	they	be	oil,	gas	or	minerals,	can	lead	to	significant	
conflicts	within	a	state,	and	over	the	last	two	and	a	half	decades,	extractive	resources	have	
played	an	integral	role	in	more	than	a	dozen	violent	intra-state	conflicts.52	The	proper	
management	of	high-value	natural	resources	is	critical	for	many	developing	countries	in	light	of	
the	significant	social,	economic,	and	political	challenges	unique	to	these	resources.	This	
challenge,	which	was	briefly	mentioned	in	the	introduction,	is	frequently	referred	to	as	the	
resource	curse.	This	section	will	discuss	the	generalized	challenges	of	natural	resource	
extraction	to	show	why	natural	resource	governance	is	needed.		
Conflicts	over	natural	resources	often	arise	when	“parties	disagree	about	the	
management,	distribution	and	protection	of	natural	resources	and	related	ecosystems;”	these	
conflicts	can	escalate	into	destructive	relationships	or	violence	when	the	parties	“are	unable	or	
unwilling	to	engage	in	a	constructive	process	of	dialogue	and	conflict	resolution.”53	There	are	
particular	ways	in	which	natural	resources	can	spur	or	give	rise	to	conflict.	High-value	resources	
and	extractive	industries	(EIs)	can	contribute	to	conflict	when	“the	benefits,	costs,	risks	and	
responsibilities	associated	with	high-value	EIs	are	not	shared	on	an	equitable	basis”,	and	
“decisions	are	taken	without	transparency	and	the	involvement	of	local	communities	and	
stakeholders”.54	Additionally,	the	extraction	of	natural	resources	can	contribute	to	conflict	if	
                                                
52	"The	extractive	industries	value	chain	as	a	framework	for	conflict	prevention."	June	2015.	Accessed	February	3,	
2017.	http://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/pdfs/UN-
WB%20Value%20Chain,%20extractive%20and%20conflict%20prevention%20discussion%20paper.pdf.	
53	"Extractive	Industries	and	Conflict."	2012.	Accessed	February	3,	2017.	http://www.un.org/en/land-natural-
resources-conflict/pdfs/GN_Extractive.pdf	.	
54	Ibid.		
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“economic,	environmental	and	social	impacts	are	not	adequately	assessed	and	addressed.”55	
Conflicts	can	also	arise	when	issues	associated	with	renewable	resources	and	environmental	
scarcity	come	into	play	in	areas	where	natural	resource	extraction	is	taking	place.	For	instance,	
if	the	availability	of	key	natural	resources,	such	as	water,	needed	to	sustain	local	livelihoods	
decreases,	user	groups	can	come	into	conflict	because	of	the	direct	competition	over	these	
resources.56	Land	tenure	can	contribute	to	conflict	as	well	“when	land	ownership,	management	
and	access	are	deemed	to	be	unjust	or	unequal,	or	when	customary	practices	conflict	with	
formal	laws.”57	
	 The	revenues	gained	from	natural	resource	extraction	can	be	especially	problematic.	
These	revenues	often	concentrate	wealth	and	power	in	the	hands	of	the	few	and	therefore	
facilitate	inequality,	poverty,	and	levels	of	corruption.58	Politicized	revenue	allocation	from	
natural	resources	based	around	various	ethnic,	religious	or	regional	lines	can	also	be	a	major	
driver	of	conflict;	the	influence	of	revenues	from	high-value	natural	resources	on	elites	within	a	
state	can	be	a	powerful	source	of	underdevelopment	and	failing	economies.59	Moreover,	this	
revenue	can	protect	“governments	from	being	responsive	to	the	electorate,	as	other	forms	of	
tax	collection	become	less	necessary,	weakening	state-society	relations”.60	If	the	decision-
making	process	becomes	removed	from	the	local	community	and	their	needs	and	interests,	the	
neglect	and	breakdown	of	a	just	and	fair	social	contract	between	the	government	and	the	
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governed	can	occur.61	Historically,	“many	resource-rich	nations	in	the	developing	world	have,	
predominantly,	been	unable	to	translate	soaring	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP)	into	
corresponding	improvements	in	citizens’	welfare”.62		
	 One	way	in	which	a	country’s	economy	can	be	negatively	affected	by	a	large	increase	in	
natural	resources	is	Dutch	disease.	This	terms	refers	to	the	large	capital	inflows	from	natural	
resource	extraction	which	“may	lead	to	an	appreciation	in	the	domestic	currency,	resulting	in	
reduced	competiveness	and	a	deterioration	of	domestic	manufacturing	and	export	sectors.”63	
The	counties	of	Iran,	Russia,	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	and	Venezuela	all	have	been	identified	as	
countries	where	they	have	stunted	manufacturing	sectors	or	they	saw	a	precipitous	decline	in	
manufacturing.64	One	way	in	which	the	impact	from	resource	revenues	can	be	mitigated	is	
through	government	investment	in	non-resource	sector	growth	or	if	the	government	places	a	
portion	of	its	resource	revenues	in	foreign	assets.65	Using	resource	revenues	effectively	is	a	
critical	challenge	that	many	countries	face.		
As	highlighted	above,	numerous	entry	points	for	conflict	or	negative	externalities	exist	
with	the	extraction	of	natural	resources.	A	country	can	be	significantly	impacted	by	conflicts	
over	natural	resources	or	by	these	negative	consequences.	The	observation	of	the	resource	
curse	and	the	particularities	of	natural	resource	governance	has	led	international	institutions	
such	as	the	United	Nations	to	set	out	frameworks	for	the	management	of	natural	resource	
extraction,	especially	in	regards	to	the	convoluted	relationships	that	exist	between	the	various	
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stakeholders.	Another	framework	is	the	Extractive	Industries	Transparency	Initiative	(EITI)	
which	again	sets	out	principles	or	a	framework	for	the	prudent	use	of	natural	resource	
wealth.66	These	frameworks	offer	a	systematic	approach	towards	the	extraction	of	natural	
resources	that	seek	to	create	more	equitable	scenarios	of	natural	resource	extraction.	In	this	
thesis,	I	specifically	draw	upon	the	Natural	Resource	Governance	Institute’s	Natural	Resource	
Charter.		
The	Natural	Resource	Charter	is	a	set	of	principles	“for	governments	and	societies	on	
how	to	best	harness	the	opportunities	created	by	extractive	resources	for	development.”67	It	
lays	out	tools	and	policy	options	that	are	designed	to	avoid	the	mismanagement	of	natural	
resources	and	to	ensure	their	ongoing	benefits.68	The	Natural	Resource	Charter	“was	written	by	
an	independent	group	of	practitioners	and	academics,	under	the	governance	of	an	oversight	
board	composed	of	distinguished	international	figures	with	first-hand	experiences	of	the	
challenges	faced	by	resource-rich	countries.”69	Its	principles	can	guide	governments’	and	
societies’	use	of	natural	resources	in	hopes	that	these	economic	opportunities	are	fully	realized	
and	can	result	in	maximum	and		sustained	returns	for	a	country’s	citizens.70	The	charter	focuses	
on	12	core	precepts	that	offer	guidance	on	key	decisions	governments	face	during	the	entire	
process	of	extracting	natural	resources.		
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In	the	following	section,	I	apply	the	Natural	Resource	Charter	through	its	various	
precepts	to	the	specificities	of	lithium	extraction	in	Bolivia.	In	some	cases,	there	isn’t	
information	specific	to	lithium	extraction,	so	I	discuss	Bolivia	and	its	actions	in	the	context	of	
natural	resource	governance	in	general	and	at	some	points	specifically	hydrocarbons.	This	
offered	another	lens	of	analysis	for	applying	the	Natural	Resource	Charter	to	Bolivia.	I	also	
grouped	the	precepts	of	the	Natural	Resource	Charter	into	broad	areas	following	the	charter’s	
decision	chain.	This	decision	chain	is	a	series	of	key	decisions	that	are	presented	in	a	linear	
fashion,	but	are	also	interwoven	with	each	other.	The	chain	begins	with	Domestic	Foundations	
for	Resource	Governance,	and	then	it	moves	on	to	Discovery	and	Deciding	to	Extract.	Next	is	
Getting	a	Good	Deal	and	then	Managing	Revenues.	Following	this	is	Investing	for	Sustainable	
Development,	and	finally	the	charter	decision	chain	ends	with	International	Foundations	for	
Resource	Governance.	Within	these	groupings,	I	present	the	specific	precept,	the	ideas	they	are	
based	upon,	and	then	with	supplementary	information	specific	to	Bolivia	I	discuss	this	criterion	
and	apply	it.	I	will	now	discuss	lithium	extraction	in	Bolivia	within	the	context	of	the	first	
section,	Domestic	Foundations	for	Resource	Governance,	and	then	move	on	through	the	entire	
charter	decision	chain.		
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IV.	Application	of	the	Natural	Resource	Charter		
A.	Domestic	Foundations	for	Resource	Governance	
	
		 The	first	section	of	the	Natural	Resource	Charter	is	concerned	with	the	broad,	domestic	
foundations	of	a	government	that	are	themselves	related	to	resource	governance	and	is	based	
off	of	precept	one	and	precept	two.	Natural	resource	wealth	can	be	a	great	benefit	to	a	
country,	but	can	also,	if	mismanaged,	lead	to	conflict	or	otherwise	impose	severe	costs	on	a	
country.	Typically,	it	is	a	governments’	responsibility	to	actively	manage	extractive	resources	
and	the	first	precept	acknowledges	this	relationship	stating,	“resource	management	should	
secure	the	greatest	benefit	for	citizens	through	an	inclusive	and	comprehensive	national	
strategy,	clear	legal	framework	and	competent	institutions”.71	The	implementation	of	a	
national	strategy	can	guide	a	government’s	decisions	so	that	its	natural	resource	management	
is	both	effective	and	sustainable.72	Bolivia’s	national	strategy	can	be	gauged	within	the	context	
of	neoextractivism	and	specifically	its	“Strategic	Plan	for	Lithium	Industrialization”.		
The	Bolivian	national	government	has	been	deemed	by	many	to	operate	under	a	
general	neoextractivist	development	plan.	Neoextractivism	specifically	“refers	to	the	expansion	
of	the	state’s	role	in	the	extractive	sector	and	growing	use	of	related	revenues	for	social	
spending	and	development	projects	for	citizens.”73	This	term	is	also	paired	with	extractivism	to	
refer	to	the	renewed	emphasis	on	natural	resource	extraction	as	a	growth	strategy	in	Latin	
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America.74	This	development	path	has	been	most	pronounced	in	the	countries	of	Bolivia,	
Ecuador,	and	Venezuela.75	In	2006,	Evo	Morales	and	his	Movimiento	Al	Socialsimo	(MAS,	
Movement	Towards	Socialism)	“implemented	a	political	project	which	has	been	presented	as	
radically	alternative	to	neoliberalism”	and	“an	important	aim	of	this	project	has	been	to	
diversify	the	economy	and	strengthen	communitarian	productive	forms,	as	part	of	a	perceived	
need	to	shift	away	from	primary	export-based	development.”76	Despite	this	stated	goal,	the	
Morales	administration	has	maintained	neoextractivist	development.	
Bolivia’s	recent	economic	growth	is	partially	attributable	to	this	neoextractivist	
development	plan.	Bolivia’s	economic	growth	averaged	4.9	percent	between	2004	and	2014	in	
part	due	to	high	commodity	prices	and	a	prudent	macroeconomic	policy.77	This	favorable	
economic	growth	led	to	a	reduction	in	moderate	poverty,	which	fell	from	59	percent	in	2005	to	
39	percent	in	2014.78	Bolivia’s	recent	strong	economic	growth	has	been	attributed	to	captive	
markets	for	natural	gas	exports;	gas	accounts	for	roughly	50%	of	Bolivia’s	total	exports.79	Bolivia	
also	nationalized	its	hydrocarbon	industry	in	2006,	and	YPFB,	Yacimientos	Petroliferos	Fiscales	
Boliviano,	is	the	state-owned	company	that	now	has	a	monopoly	over	Bolivia’s	petroleum	
resources.80	
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Lithium	has	taken	a	central	position	in	the	conception	of	Bolivia’s	future	economy,	and	
development	of	Bolivia	and	can	be	understood	within	the	context	of	this	national	development	
plan.	The	inauguration,	in	2008,	of	the	state-run	lithium	industry	“brought	great	hope	and	
heightened	expectations	regarding	Bolivia’s	ability	to	rewrite	its	long	and	troubled	history	with	
natural	resource	extraction”.81	COMIBOL	also	called	“progress	in	lithium	industrialization	a	
‘dream-come-true’	for	the	struggling	southwest	region	of	Potosí,	and	this	industrialization	is	
seen	as	the	route	to	paved	roads,	economic	prosperity,	and	the	ending	of	“plunder	and	poverty	
related	to	natural	resources	in	the	country.”82	This	rhetoric	falls	in	line	with	this	neoextractivist	
framework.	Evo	Morales	might	have	said	it	best:	“after	petroleum	and	natural	gas,	lithium	is	
very	important	to	the	economy.	But	the	moment	we	begin	to	develop	the	industrialization	of	
lithium	it	will	become	the	most	important.”83	 	
Bolivia’s	national	strategy	can	also	be	gauged	through	its	ambitious	“Strategic	Plan	for	
Lithium	Industrialization”	which	called	for	a	$900	million	commitment	to	the	development	of	a	
state-run	industry.	The	plan	itself	called	for	Bolivia	to	extract	and	process	lithium	for	
commercial	use	on	its	own	and	Bolivia	was	prepared	to	finance	the	entire	chain	of	production,	
including	a	battery	plant.84	Initially,	the	government	expected	production	capacity	to	start	up	in	
2013	with	the	development	of	larger	industrial	and	chemical	plants,	and	full	scale	battery	
production	was	set	to	begin	in	2014.85	While	Bolivia	has	been	producing	pilot	volumes	of	
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lithium	carbonate,	it	is	still	years	away	from	realizing	the	goals	that	it	set	out	for	2013	and	2014.	
Despite	years	of	failed	partnerships	and	production,	Bolivia’s	recent	partnership	with	K-UTEC	
AG	Salt	Technologies	suggests	that	the	state	is	now	making	progress	towards	its	goal.	Bolivia’s	
own	Gerencia	Nacional	de	Recursos	Evaporícitos	(GNRE),	a	wing	of	its	national	mining	company	
COMIBOL,	will	still	need	to	put	the	installation,	assembly	and	commissioning	of	the	production	
plant	out	to	tender	once	this	is	complete.	Therefore,	the	GNRE’s	goal	of	bringing	online	a	
15,000	TPA	(tonnes	per	annum)	lithium	carbonate	production	line	in	the	third	quarter	of	2018	
may	still	be	further	away	than	estimated.	It	is	difficult	to	say	when	these	goals	will	be	realized,	
and	this	strategic	plan	should	be	reevaluated	given	the	circumstances	above.			
	 Bolivia’s	decision	to	push	ahead	with	extraction	may	be	suspect	as	well.	The	GNRE	has	
indicated	numerous	times	that	it	has	the	requisite	evidence	from	its	pilot	plant	to	move	on	to	
the	next	stage	in	developing	the	Salar,	but	this	evidence	has	never	been	verified	by	an	external	
audit.86	Without	clear	feasibility	studies,	“it	is	difficult	to	attest	to	all	the	state	enterprise	
indicates”.87	Juan	Carlos	Zuleta,	a	La	Paz-based	lithium	economics	analyst	suggested	that	after	
six	years	of	pilot	work	“they	realized	they	were	late”	to	the	lithium	market	and	are	“pushing	
ahead	to	industrial	plant	stage	in	spite	of	pilot	test	results	rather	than	because	of	them.”88	
The	Bolivian	government’s	estimates	of	its	capabilities	to	bring	lithium	to	market	fall	in	
line	with	the	rhetoric	the	state	attaches	to	its	reserves	of	lithium	and	neoextractivism.	Evo	
Morales	has	stated	that	“the	state	will	never	lose	sovereignty	when	it	comes	to	lithium”	and	
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that	“from	this	brine,	there	will	be	lithium	cars	coming	out	of	Bolivia,	this	is	the	dream.”89	
Again,	conceptualized	within	the	lithium	resource	base	itself,	is	a	goal	of	development	and	the	
attainment	of	revenues.	The	ambition	or	moreover	the	dream	of	lithium	as	a	step	to	
revitalization	may	harm	the	country	if	it	is	pursued	haphazardly.	The	Bolivian	government	has	
clearly	signaled	that	lithium	is	of	great	importance	to	the	state	both	rhetorically	and	financially.	
However,	this	rhetoric	hasn’t	been	consolidated	into	a	comprehensive	national	strategy.	While	
the	state	is	now	making	more	progress	towards	the	opening	of	a	large	scale	production	plant,	
investing	in	this	industry	without	a	comprehensive	understanding	of	its	lithium	resources	could	
harm	or	damage	the	state.	This	nascent	dream	of	lithium	may	not	come	to	light	if	the	pursuit	of	
extraction	continues	without	a	comprehensive	understanding	of	not	only	its	reserves	but	the	
specificities	of	those	reserves,	i.e.	the	brine’s	magnesium	content	or	the	evaporation	rate	of	the	
Salar.	While	the	extent	to	which	Bolivia	has	a	comprehensive	national	strategy	for	the	
extraction	of	lithium	is	unclear,	the	state	does	have	a	clear	legal	framework	through	which	it	
can	operate.		
The	Bolivian	government	in	1974	declared	the	Uyuni	Basin	to	be	a	Fiscal	Reserve.	This	
designation	“gives	the	Bolivian	state	ownership	of	the	Salar	and	the	legal	right	to	exploit	and	
administer	all	of	the	natural	resources	within	the	reserve’s	boundaries.”90	Legislation	in	2008	
declared	the	development	of	natural	resources	from	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	to	be	a	national	priority	
and	with	the	specific	goal	of	supporting	economic	and	social	development	in	Potosí.91	The	
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constitution	also	inscribes	the	state’s	right	to	develop	natural	resources.	Article	349	states	that	
“natural	resources	are	the	property	and	direct	domain,	indivisible	and	without	limitation,	of	the	
Bolivian	people,	and	their	administration	corresponds	to	the	State	on	behalf	of	the	collective	
interest.”92	The	state	“shall	assume	control	and	direction	of	the	exploration,	exploitation,	
industrialization,	transport	and	sale	of	strategic	natural	resources	through	public,	cooperative	
or	community	entities,	which	may	in	turn	contract	private	enterprises	and	form	mixed	
enterprises.”93	Towards	profits,	the	constitution	maintains	that	“profits	obtained	from	the	
exploitation	and	the	sale	of	the	natural	resources	shall	be	distributed	and	reinvested	to	
promote	economic	diversification	in	the	different	territorial	levels	of	the	State”	but	that	
“processes	of	industrialization	shall	be	carried	out	with	preference	given	to	the	place	of	origin	
of	the	production,	and	conditions	shall	be	created	which	favor	competitiveness	in	the	internal	
and	international	market.”94	Finally,	the	state	also	is	to	“promote	primarily	the	industrialization	
of	renewable	and	nonrenewable	natural	resources,	within	the	framework	of	respect	for	and	
protection	of	the	environment,	in	order	to	guarantee	the	generation	of	employment	and	the	
economic	and	social	consumption	of	the	population.”95	By	law,	environmental	and	social	
impact	assessments	must	be	performed,	although	the	results	are	not	published.96	
In	conclusion,	the	Bolivian	state	has	legal	authority	and	property	of	the	entire	Salar	and	
is	the	final	arbitrator	of	lithium	extraction	within	this	area.	Additionally,	the	constitution	of	the	
state	inscribes	these	rights	as	well,	and	sets	out	a	legal	precedent	for	the	state	to	pursue	lithium	
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extraction.	This	constitutional	framework	in	regards	to	natural	resources	also	maintains	a	
preference	for	the	industrialization	of	the	Potosí	Department	and	gives	some	weight	to	natural	
resource	governance	in	light	of	the	government.	In	all,	the	Bolivian	government	through	its	
constitution	and	the	declaration	of	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	as	a	fiscal	reserve	maintains	and	exerts	
control	of	this	resource	more	so	than	any	other	stakeholder.	However,	it	also	maintains	within	
the	constitution	the	concerns	of	other	stakeholders.	The	next	section	will	discuss	Bolivian	
institutions	and	whether	they	are	competent.			
The	implementation	of	an	industrial	lithium	plant	could	be	undermined	by	corruption	
within	Bolivian	society.	For	instance,	“the	judiciary,	the	police	and	the	public	administration	
more	broadly	are	perceived	as	the	most	corrupt	institutions	of	the	country”	and	experts	have	
described	corruption	as	an	“institutionalized	and	socially	accepted	norm”	within	Bolivia,	
particularly	in	regards	to	the	widespread	use	of	facilitation	payments.97	Despite	an	institutional	
and	legal	framework	that	appears	robust,	Bolivia	still	faces	significant	difficulties	here.	The	lack	
of	capacity	and	resources	undermine	these	new	institutions,	while	“low	salaries,	lack	of	training	
and	a	burdensome	bureaucracy	continue	to	create	opportunities	and	incentives	for	
corruption.”98	Towards	lithium	specifically,	“the	development	of	the	lithium	exploitation	plan	is	
shared	between	government	bodies	known	for	their	lack	of	transparency”	and	a	“frequency	of	
conflict	of	interest	problems.”99	YPFB,	the	state-owned	hydrocarbons	company,	has	been	the	
source	of	scandals	that	have	ranged	from	“nepotism	in	appointments	to	major	kickbacks	that	
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led	to	the	dismissal	and	sentencing	of	the	head	of	the	company.”100	The	Bolivian	government	
has	implemented	robust	anti-corruption	legal	frameworks,	but	again,	the	insufficient	abilities	
and	resources	of	the	administration	have	not	significantly	decreased	corruption.101	Corruption	
could	significantly	hinder	Bolivia’s	ability	to	utilize	its	lithium	resources.	This	affects	the	state	
entirely	along	the	entire	charter	decision	chain.	For	instance,	corruption	could	affect	the	foreign	
corporations	that	the	state	partners	with.	Later	on,	revenues	from	lithium	could	be	diverted	
from	social	programs	or	municipalities	to	the	pockets	of	various	officials.	Weak	institutions	are	
a	key	concern	for	Bolivia.		
The	next	precept	in	this	section	discuss	the	ability	to	accrue	benefits	from	natural	
resources	with	the	public.	Resource	wealth	can	lead	to	sustained	prosperity	if	the	government	
is	publicly	accountable	and	scrutiny	of	behavior	can	occur	so	as	to	provide	a	deterrent	against	
corruption	and	an	incentive	for	performance.102	Information	should	be	transparent	along	the	
entire	chain	of	decisions,	and	nationally	owned	resource	companies	should	be	transparent	as	
well	in	their	strategies	and	spending.103	Therefore,	the	second	precept	states,	“Resource	
governance	requires	decision	makers	to	be	accountable	to	an	informed	public.”104	Bolivia’s	civil	
society	can	check	the	government	in	this	regard,	but	there	are	concerns	given	the	country’s	lack	
of	transparency	in	regards	to	information.	Bolivia’s	civil	society	and	its	ability	to	hold	decision	
makers	accountable	can	be	partly	observed	through	the	operation	of	the	media	within	Bolivia	
as	well	as	its	treatment	of	non-governmental	organizations.		
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Bolivia’s	civil	society	has	a	number	of	very	active	non-governmental	organizations.105	
These	organizations	have	provided	checks	to	the	state,	so	much	so	that	their	relationship	with	
the	current	administration	of	President	Evo	Morales	is	contentious.	In	2015,	four	NGOs,	who	
conduct	investigations	on	economic,	social,	labor,	environmental,	and	agrarian	issues	in	Bolivia,	
were	accused	of	lying	and	political	meddling	to	advance	the	interests	of	foreign	governments	
and	corporations.106	However,	it	has	been	suggested	that	this	controversy	has	“arisen	amidst	
escalations	between	the	Morales	government	and	indigenous,	environmental,	and	civil	society	
organizations	that	have	challenged	Bolivia’s	growing	dependence	on	an	extractivist	
development	model.”107		One	NGO,	CEDIB,	documented	deficiencies	in	recent	community	
consultation	processes	in	regards	to	oil	and	gas	development;	another,	Fundación	Tierra,	
investigated	“changes	in	government	agricultural	policy	that	favor	agribusiness	interests,	limit	
opportunities	for	land	redistribution,	and	contribute	to	the	marginalization	of	peasant	
farmers.”108	The	government	has	argued	that	“NGOs	have	become	‘less	and	less	relevant’	
under	Morales’s	‘government	of	the	social	movements,’	which	represents	and	incorporates	
indigenous	and	peasant	sectors	at	all	levels,	obviating	the	need	for	intermediaries	or	
advocates.”109	Morales	himself	has	argued	that	“we	don’t	need	NGOs	using	social	and	
environmental	movements	to	create	opposition	and	conspire	against	the	state”.110	NGOs	have	
played	an	important	part	in	Bolivia	by	challenging	some	of	the	actions	of	the	national	
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government	in	regards	to	resource	extraction,	and	they	play	an	important	role	in	the	promotion	
of	an	active	civil	society	that	can	scrutinize	the	behavior	of	the	government.	
The	Bolivian	media	is	another	facet	of	civil	society	that	can	report	on	and	scrutinize	the	
government’s	behavior	in	regards	to	lithium,	but	there	are	problems	here.	For	instance,	“there	
is	a	strong	divide	between	the	private	media,	leaning	towards	the	views	of	the	opposition,	and	
the	state-owned	media”,	which	is	notoriously	pro-Morales.111	The	national	government	pushed	
back	against	the	opposition	with	the	passing	of	a	controversial	anti-racism	law	in	2010	that	
allowed	for	economic	sanctions	and	the	suspension	of	licenses	of	media	outlets	expressing	
racist	views;	Bolivian	law	guarantees	freedom	of	expression	and	freedom	of	the	media,	so	
experts	and	journalists	have	considered	this	law	to	be	a	violation.112	Media	within	Bolivia	is	
contentious,	but	journalists	at	the	moment	can	still	operate	as	a	check	on	the	national	
government.	
In	regards	to	information	and	reporting	practices,	there	are	again	concerns.	A	number	of	
government	agencies	publish	data	on	extractive	industries,	but	“this	information	is	scattered	
and	incomplete”.113	The	Transparency	and	Access	to	Government	Information	Law	dictates	
“that	all	institutions	in	the	executive	branch	of	government	must	publish	their	revenues	and	
satisfy	access	to	information	requests	in	a	timely	manner.”114	However,	there	is	“a	lack	of	
awareness	of	the	obligation	to	provide	information;	a	sense	of	ownership	of	information	on	the	
part	of	government	officials;	scant	training	in	this	area;	a	high	turnover	of	responsible	public	
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servants;	and	a	sense	of	inability	on	the	part	of	society	to	request	information”.115	In	all,	this	
lack	of	information	may	contribute	or	make	subservient	interests	or	concerns	of	the	populace	
in	regards	to	natural	resource	extraction	in	Bolivia.	This	lack	of	implementation	allows	Bolivia’s	
various	nationalized	resource	companies	to	not	be	fully	transparent	in	their	conduct.	This	lack	
of	information	can	also	affect	civil	society’s	ability	to	report	on	and	scrutinize	the	behaviors	of	
governmental	officials.	This	precept	and	its	application	indicates	that	the	Bolivian	national	
government	has	much	to	do	in	this	area	to	effectively	manage	natural	resource	extraction.			
	
B.	Discovery	and	Deciding	to	Extract	
	 This	section	is	concerned	with	efficient	exploration	and	production	operations.	Here,	
precept	three	of	the	Natural	Resource	Charter	states	that	“the	government	should	encourage	
efficient	exploration	and	production	operations,	and	allocate	rights	transparently.”116	Firstly,	
this	can	be	done	by	ensuring	that	the	government	has	uncontested	jurisdiction	over	areas	it	
intends	to	open	for	exploration	and	that	is	also	has	a	thorough	understanding	of	its	resource	
base.117	The	government	must	also	decide	who	should	undertake	exploration	and	production	
operations	and	to	do	so	efficiently.118	So	far,	the	property	rights	of	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	are	in	
question,	and	there	is	a	degree	of	uncertainty	about	the	resource	base	of	the	Salar.	Bolivia	has	
also	not	encouraged	efficient	exploration	and	production	operations	either.			
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Firstly,	the	securing	of	property	rights	to	the	Salar	has	lacked	transparency	because	
there	are	some	disputes	over	the	mineral	wealth	of	the	Salar.	Additionally,	the	Bolivian	
government	has	in	other	instances	also	prioritized	hydrocarbon	companies’	property	rights	
over	indigenous	claims	to	territory,	suggesting	that	this	isn’t	unique	to	lithium	or	the	Salar	de	
Uyuni.	The	1974	declaration	of	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	and	its	mineral	resources	gives	the	Bolivian	
state	basic	ownership	of	the	Salar	and	the	legal	right	to	the	natural	resources	within	the	
reserve’s	boundaries.	However,	since	that	time,	the	boundaries	of	the	fiscal	reserve	have	been	
moved	and	expanded	five	times.119	Teodoro	Blanco,	a	legal	territorial	advisor	to	communities	in	
Nor	Lípez,	Southwest	Potosí	argues	this	a	problem:	“We	were	never	consulted	when	the	
boundaries	of	the	fiscal	reserve	were	determined	and	re-determined	despite	the	fact	that	our	
communities	and	crop	fields	fall	within	its	boundaries.	Now	that	we	are	struggling	to	gain	
collective	titles	to	our	lands,	a	right	that	we	are	afforded	by	Bolivia’s	constitution,	we	are	
running	into	problems.”120	Within	Bolivia,	“hydrocarbon	companies’	property	rights	have	taken	
priority	over	indigenous	claims	to	territory;	indigenous	populations	have	not	had	access	to	the	
information	that	states	and	companies	control	regarding	natural	gas	extraction,	even	when	this	
extraction	occurs	in	spaces	occupied	and	used	by	indigenous	people”.121	This	occurs	despite	the	
fact	that	the	Bolivian	constitution	requires	that	“the	right	to	prior	obligatory	consultation	by	the	
State	with	respect	to	the	exploitation	of	nonrenewable	natural	resources	in	the	territory	
[indigenous	peoples]	inhabit	shall	be	respected	and	guaranteed,	in	good	faith	and	upon	
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agreement.”122	However,	“the	participatory	rights	of	affected	communities	have	been	viewed	
by	representatives	from	the	state	and	extraction	companies	as	obsolete	and	have	in	practice	
often	been	absent	or	limited	to	a	formality”.123	The	“right	to	prior	consultation	has	been	
increasingly	called	into	question	and	viewed	as	obsolete	by	state	decision	makers	and	
corporate	representatives	alike”	as	“nationalized	corporations	and	the	plurinational	state	have	
been	framed	in	the	public	discourse	as	belonging	to	‘all	Bolivians”.124	In	this	case,	the	fiscal	
reserve	and	its	boundaries	may	be	contentious	given	the	narrative	above	and	suggests	that	
indigenous	property	rights	or	territorial	claims	may	be	put	to	the	wayside.	This	process	lacks	
the	transparency	towards	the	determination	of	property	rights	suggested	by	this	precept.		
Secondly,	as	mentioned	within	the	background	section	on	the	Salar	de	Uyuni,	Bolivia’s	
government	has	maintained	that	its	resource	base	is	far	above	and	beyond	that	of	other	
estimates.	However,	it	is	difficult	to	know	whether	this	claim	is	state	rhetoric,	an	accurate	claim	
of	its	resource	base,	or	a	blatant	misunderstanding	of	its	resource	base.	The	Bolivian	
government,	through	COMIBOL,	has	stated	in	the	past	that	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	has	in	situ	
resources	of	350	million	tons	of	lithium.125	It	has	also	claimed	a	100	million	metric	ton	base	of	
lithium,	which	may	be	suspect	as	well.	Other	estimates	are	again	far	more	conservative.	I	am	
inclined	to	think	that	these	estimations	are	exaggerations,	given	other	widely	available	
estimates,	but	the	validity	of	this	claim	is	difficult	to	determine	given	the	generally	secretive	
nature	of	extractive	industries.	I	am	also	skeptical	of	the	Bolivian	government’s	estimates	
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because	they	may	be	used	for	political	purposes	that	fall	in	line	with	neoextractivist	rhetoric.	An	
inadequate	understanding	of	this	resource	base	could	pose	problems	later	on.	At	the	minimum,	
there	is	a	degree	of	uncertainty	in	regards	to	Bolivia’s	lithium	base.		
	 Finally,	the	Bolivian	government’s	methodology	for	partnering	with	foreign	firms	for	
exploration	and	production	operations	has	not	occurred	efficiently.	To	reiterate,	Bolivia	is	still	
significantly	behind	schedule.	Bolivia’s	reluctance	to	involve	foreign	investment	has	possibly	left	
it	behind	when	compared	to	the	marketplace.	In	2009,	the	Bolivian	government	was	in	talks	
with	“France’s	Bollore	Group,	South	Korea’s	LG	Group	and	Japan’s	Sumitomo	and	
Mitsubishi”.126	Carlos	Alberto	López,	a	former	energy	minister	and	consultant	with	Cambridge	
Energy	Research	Associates,	suggested	that	“Bolivia’s	ideological	face	does	not	square	with	
business	and	commercial	realities.	I	doubt	lithium’s	potential	will	be	realized	in	the	short	or	
medium	term.”127	Typifying	these	difficulties	may	be	the	case	of	Korea’s	involvement	in	lithium	
extraction	in	Bolivia.	In	2012,	“Korea’s	state-run	mineral	development	corporation	set	up	a	joint	
venture	with	its	Bolivian	counterpart	to	develop	lithium	products”.128	This	joint	venture	
involved	the	KORES	consortium	(LG	International	Corp.,	Kyungdon	Co.,	Union	Corp.,	and	Aju	
Corp.),	POSCO,	Korea’s	leading	steelmaker,	and	COMIBOL,	Bolivia’s	prior	lithium	corporation.129	
COMIBOL	was	to	provide	the	lithium,	nickel	and	manganese	while	this	Korean	consortium	was	
to	manufacture	battery-related	parts	and	other	battery	products.130	Yet,	these	contracts	
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ultimately	failed	later	on,	with	the	Korean	ambassador	in	La	Paz	arguing	that	Bolivia	was	
missing	an	opportunity	to	enter	the	world	lithium	market.131	Luis	Echazú,	affiliated	with	the	
former	nationalized	company,	GNRE,	stated	in	the	past	that	Bolivia	is	entering	the	marketplace	
at	the	right	time,	given	that	“the	lithium	boom	will	begin	around	2020”,	and	that	“consumption	
in	the	last	five	years	has	grown	at	around	five	or	six	per	cent”.132	The	Bolivian	national	
government	still	maintains	that	it	is	on	the	right	track	in	regards	to	industrializing	its	lithium	
resources.		
	 There	are	still	questions	to	whether	or	when	the	lithium	of	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	will	be	
effectively	utilized.	K-UTEC	AG	Salt	Technologies,	who	was	contracted	in	August	of	2105	to	
design	an	industrial	plant	to	produce	lithium	is	still	months	behind	schedule	and	there	is	“no	
clear	and	consistent	reference	to	the	state	of	[sic]	situation	regarding	the	elaboration	of	this	
design.”133	Juan	Carlos	Zuleta		stated,	“I	am	really	worried	we	are	going	to	miss	this	huge	
opportunity	to	become	a	lithium	power	in	the	world”.134	As	emphasized	above,	the	Bolivian	
national	government	has	had	difficulties	partnering	with	foreign	partners,	and	in	the	future	it	
may	continue	to	do	so	because	of	its	stance	towards	its	lithium	deposits	and	its	conception	of	
this	resource	within	the	larger	economy.		
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C.	A	Good	Deal	
This	section	of	the	Natural	Resource	Charter	and	its	application	to	Bolivia	illustrates	
certain	steps	that	a	country	can	take	to	ensure	that	they	are	benefiting	from	natural	resource	
extraction.	Among	other	things,	this	involves	mitigating	potential	damages	that	people	or	the	
environment	may	bear	as	well	as	capturing	value	from	the	extraction	for	the	country	through	
tax	revenues.	Within	this	section,	I	will	largely	focus	on	precept	five,	which	is	concerned	with	
environmental	and	social	costs,	but	I	will	briefly	mention	the	other	precepts.		
First,	precept	four	proposes	that	“tax	regimes	and	contractual	terms	should	enable	the	
government	to	realize	the	full	value	of	its	resources	consistent	with	attracting	necessary	
investment,	and	should	be	robust	to	changing	circumstances.”135	This	precept	was	difficult	to	
apply	to	lithium	as	the	terms	the	national	government	is	offering	foreign	partners	is	generally	
secretive.	In	the	past,	the	national	government	has	indicated	that	it	wants	to	retain	at	least	60%	
of	the	profits	from	any	partnership.136	The	country’s	reluctance	to	involve	foreign	investment	in	
this	process	has	possibly	stunted	Bolivia’s	ability	to	utilize	its	lithium	resources.137	Beyond	this	
information,	it	is	difficult	to	comprehensively	apply	precept	four,	but	this	guideline	should	be	
applied	by	the	Bolivian	national	government	in	regards	to	lithium.	One	of	the	most	immediately	
pressing	concerns	for	the	extraction	of	lithium	in	Bolivia	is	the	possible	negative	effects	this	
extraction	may	cause	on	the	environment	and	local	livelihoods.		
                                                
135	Natural	Resource	Charter.	
136	Achtenberg,	Emily.	"Bolivia's	Lithium	Challenge."	NACLA.	Accessed	April	30,	2017.	
https://nacla.org/news/bolivia%E2%80%99s-lithium-challenge.	
137	Mccormick,	Myles.	
	
	
	 40	
A	primary	concern	of	all	natural	resource	governance	is	the	consideration	of	the	
environmental	and	social	costs	that	often	affect	the	people	in	the	vicinity	of	natural	resource	
extraction.	Effective	resource	management	should	minimize	the	costs	for	affected	
communities,	while	realizing	the	benefits.138	Local	communities	should	be	involved	in	the	
decision	making	process	and	the	government	should	clearly	establish	and	define	ownership	
rights	to	sub-soil	wealth,	including	the	assignment	of	subsequent	revenues.139	Efforts	should	be	
made	to	measure	and	mitigate	any	negative	effects	from	extraction,	and	to	take	into	account	
opportunities	to	develop	other	local	benefits	from	extraction.	Ultimately,	there	may	be	a	
dichotomy	between	the	interests	of	a	local	population	and	that	of	a	country	as	a	whole,	so	
remediation	should	occur	if	local	groups	are	negatively	impacted.140	These	concerns	are	
capsulated	by	precept	five	which	advocates	that	“the	government	should	pursue	opportunities	
for	local	benefits,	and	account	for,	mitigate	and	offset	the	environmental	and	social	costs	of	
resource	extraction	projects”.141		
It	is	important	to	note	that	there	is	some	local	support	for	this	project,	but	that	it	is	
contentious;	the	Uyuni	Regional	Peasant	Federation	initially	proposed	the	industrial	lithium	
mining	project.142	The	government	has	solicited	the	involvement	of	the	local	communities	on	a	
number	of	occasions,	such	as	the	inauguration	of	the	lithium	pilot	plant,	but	there	are	groups	
and	individuals	who	did	not	participate	in	this	process	and	claim	that	they	were	never	consulted	
about	the	existence	or	location	of	the	pilot	plant.143	Members	of	the	local	community	also	were	
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concerned	that	the	groups	that	were	consulted	had	political	ties	to	the	Morales	government	
and	the	MAS	party;	For	instance,	local	quinoa	producer	groups	were	interviewed	and	they	
claimed	that	they	hadn’t	been	consulted	despite	the	fact	that	this	project	could	greatly	impact	
them.144	COMIBOL	officials	also	were	“unable	to	provide	a	clear	methodology	for	their	plan	to	
ensure	local	participation	and	mitigate	social	impacts	of	the	project,	even	though	they	cited	the	
importance	of	doing	so.”145	The	opaque	nature	of	these	consultations	suggests	that	the	Bolivian	
national	government	is	willing	to	push	ahead	with	the	project	despite	concerns,	and	it	does	not	
seem	that	the	state	is	actively	looking	to	mitigate	potential	effects.	There	are	also	local	
concerns	about	the	allocation	of	revenues.		
While	some	of	Potosí’s	indigenous	communities	welcome	the	new	lithium	industry,	
there	“are	unresolved	issues	related	to	land-ownership	and	resource	royalties”.146	For	instance,	
“Potosí	civic	and	union	leaders	believe	the	department	is	entitled	to	a	greater	part	of	the	
lithium	benefits	for	local	development;	in	2011,	the	government	allocated	just	5	per	cent	of	
lithium	royalties	to	the	area.”147	The	local	communities	also	expect	the	industrialization	of	
lithium	to	result	in	investments	to	infrastructure	and	education	in	the	area.148	This	sentiment	is	
summed	up	by	one	local	salt	gatherer	who	said	“we	know	that	Bolivia	can	become	the	Saudi	
Arabia	of	lithium.	We	are	poor,	but	we	are	not	stupid	peasants.	The	lithium	may	be	Bolivia’s,	
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but	it	is	also	our	property.”149	Allocating	the	appropriate	amount	of	royalties	or	revenue	to	the	
local	area	is	challenging.	Here	it	seems	that	there	could	be	a	conflict	in	regards	to	this	
allocation,	but	it	remains	to	be	seen	whether	this	will	materialize	in	the	future.	Besides	disputes	
over	royalties,	there	are	also	significant	environmental	and	social	costs	that	the	local	
communities	and	peoples	of	this	region	could	necessarily	bear,	and	these	costs	may	be	difficult	
to	offset	or	mitigate.		
Today,	local	communities	in	this	area	rely	on	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	and	its	surrounding	
ecosystems	for	their	economic	survival.	Historically,	the	Potosí	Department	has	been	affected	
by	the	economic,	social	and	political	dynamics	of	resource	extraction	since	colonial	times.150	
Local	political	and	civil	society	leaders	in	Potosi	“do	not	want	to	see	again	the	disastrous	impact	
of	silver	and	tin	exploitation	in	the	past,	and	hope	that	lithium	can	offer	an	avenue	to	depart	
from	former	extractive	patterns.”151	Nearly	all	of	the	economic	activity	in	the	region	“revolves	
around	salt	harvesting,	quinoa	production,	llama	herding,	mining,	and,	more	recently,	a	boom	
in	foreign	tourists	seeking	out	the	unique	desolate	landscape	of	the	Salar.”152	The	extraction	of	
lithium	may	cause	significant	consequences.	Tourism	and	quinoa	production	could	be	
significantly	impacted	and	they	are	especially	important	in	this	region	because	they	provide	a	
sustainable,	long-term	economic	lifeline	to	the	area.”153	While	the	expectations	for	the	
economic	benefits	from	lithium	are	also	high	across	the	board,	the	actualized	benefits	in	regard	
to	job	generation	and	return	in	terms	of	fiscal	revenue	to	the	region	and	the	local	population	
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are	unclear.	There	is	a	misconception	that	the	lithium	project	will	bring	a	large	quantity	of	new	
jobs	to	the	region:	official	estimates	only	predict	700-1500	jobs	and	who	those	jobs	will	go	to	is	
unclear.154	Local	jobs	tied	to	the	lithium	project	may	not	offset	the	negative	externalities	
associated	here	with	quinoa	production	and	water.		
The	area	around	the	Uyuni	salt	flat	is	characterized	by	the	growing	of	quinoa.155	Quinoa	
is	uniquely	suited	for	the	difficult	climate	of	the	Salar	region,	and	currently	there	are	few	other	
livelihood	options	outside	of	quinoa	production.156	Quinoa	has	been	prioritized	by	the	
government	as	a	source	to	increase	the	country’s	income	and	its	production	has	intensified	
because	of	the	increasing	prices	on	the	international	market;	the	price	of	quinoa	sold	by	a	
farmer	has	almost	tripled	from	1999	to	2008.157	Domestic	consumption	has	decreased	and	now	
ninety	percent	of	the	total	quinoa	production	is	now	exported.158	However,	ground	water	
diversion	and	contamination	associated	with	mining	activities	could	threaten	this	agricultural	
production.159	A	serious	water	crisis	due	to	mining	could	occur,	because	the	region	is	already	
short	of	this	resource	for	traditional	agriculture	and	herding.160		
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Currently,	“the	situation	in	the	southern	altiplano	is	severe	with	decreasing	water	
resources	available”,	and	the	mining	industry	competes	for	these	water	resources.161	
Indigenous	communities	have	also		expressed	concern	over	the	potential	for	a	serious	water	
crisis	as	a	result	of	mining	in	this	area.162	The	state	provides	a	legal	framework	for	water	in	the	
constitution	saying	that	it	“shall	protect	and	guarantee	the	priority	use	of	water	for	life”	and	
“the	State	shall	recognize,	respect	and	protect	the	uses	and	customs	of	the	community,	of	its	
local	authorities	and	the	rural	native	indigenous	organizations	over	the	right,	management	and	
administration	of	sustainable	water.”163	Despite	this	legal	framework,	the	Bolivian	national	
government	may	not	enforce	these	regulations.	Marco	Octavio	Ribera,	of	Bolivia’s	
Environmental	Defense	League	(LIDEMA),	stated	that,	“not	one	environmental	impact	
assessment	has	ever	stopped	a	potentially	risky	project	in	Bolivia.”164	It	also	seems	that	the	
Bolivian	national	government	has	not	taken	the	appropriate	steps	to	understand	the	impacts	
the	extraction	of	lithium	could	have.	Elizabeth	Lopez	Canelas,	of	the	Bolivian	Forum	on	
Environment	and	Development	(FOBOMADE),	stated	that,	“there’s	no	information,	no	water	
use	nor	hydrological	studies,	so	how	can	they	begin	to	project	what	the	long-term	effects	might	
be?	This	is	supposedly	a	project	to	improve	the	region,	but	what	if	it	makes	living	impossible?	
How	could	it	be	called	sustainable	development?”165	As	mentioned	earlier,	while	there	is	an	
appropriate	legal	framework	for	natural	resource	extraction,	the	institutionalized	enactment	of	
that	framework	frequently	falls	to	the	wayside	and	may	affect	local	peoples	living	in	this	region.	
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Here,	the	appropriate	steps	have	not	been	taken	to	mitigate	in	the	future	the	negative	effects	
on	water	in	the	area	and	on	quinoa	production.		
Other	counties	that	extract	lithium	from	salt	brines	have	faced	this	same	problem.	
Argentina,	another	state	within	the	lithium	triangle,	has	been	producing	lithium	for	years	now	
but	indigenous	groups	have	faced	significant	hardships.	In	2011,	the	International	Commission	
of	Jurists	(ICJ)	called	on	the	State	of	Argentina	to	take	effective	measures	to	protect	the	human	
rights	of	indigenous	groups,	which	had	been	adversely	affected	by	lithium	exploration	and	
exploitation.166	Indigenous	communities	of	the	Subcuenca	and	Laguna	de	Guayatayoc,	in	the	
Salinas	Grandes,	alleged	“that	the	authorities	have	denied	them	the	right	to	be	consulted	on	
the	use	of	resources	on	their	territories”,	which	is	a	right	guaranteed	by	the	International	
Labour	Organization	Convention	169	and	is	also	contained	in	the	United	Nations	Declaration	on	
the	Rights	of	the	Indigenous	Peoples.167	The	ICJ	found	that	private	companies	were	“already	
damaging	the	salt	flats	and	surrounding	highly	fragile	natural	environment,	including	the	water	
tables	and	freshwater	resources,	which	the	indigenous	groups	depend	on	for	their	livelihoods	
and	cultural	and	economic	well-being.”168	As	in	the	case	of	Argentina,	local	concerns	and	
livelihoods	are	subservient	to	lithium	extraction,	and	these	negative	consequences	were	not	
properly	accounted	for	or	remediated.	This	could	end	up	being	in	the	situation	in	the	Salar	de	
Uyuni	region.		
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Tourism	in	this	area	may	not	be	significantly	impacted	because	of	the	sheer	size	of	the	
Salar.	The	Salar	de	Uyuni	is	a	10,582	square	kilometer	salt	plain,	and	while	it	is	the	second	most	
popular	tourist	attraction	in	the	country,	the	area	of	lithium	extraction	would	possibly	only	be	a	
small	percentage	of	the	salt	plain.169	The	state	has	indicated	that	it	would	extract	lithium	from	a	
400	square	kilometer	area.	Additionally,	the	current	pilot	plants,	prospecting	wells	and	pools	
are	situated	in	the	southeastern	part	of	the	plain,	140km	from	the	town	of	Uyuni,	and	they	
cover	27	square	kilometers	total.170	It	is	unlikely,	at	least	in	the	near	future,	that	tourism	will	be	
significantly	affected	in	terms	of	not	being	able	to	utilize	the	Salar	de	Uyuni.	However,	tourism	
operators	have	expressed	concern	that	this	project	could	affect	their	viability	and	their	
livelihoods.171	Tourism	could	be	impacted	if	there	are	again	difficulties	with	water	among	other	
things.	Additionally,	if	this	lithium	project	become	a	significant	blight	on	the	landscape	in	the	
future,	then	tourism	could	be	affected.	These	effects	may	or	may	not	be	realized,	but	the	
Bolivian	national	government	should	seek	to	mitigate	these	effects.		
	Finally,	this	section	ends	with	precept	six,	“Nationally	owned	companies	should	be	
accountable,	with	well-defined	mandates	and	an	objective	of	commercial	efficiency.”172	For	
example,	national	companies	can,	if	assigned	inappropriate	roles	or	governed	poorly,	pose	a	
risk	to	a	country	and	take	away	value	rather	than	create	value.173	Inefficiency	or	the	self-
interest	of	executives	can	limit	or	drain	government	revenues	as	well.	This	guideline	was	
difficult	to	apply	in	practice	to	Bolivia’s	nationalized	companies	as	I	faced	difficulties	
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determining	their	accountability.	I	have	included	this	precept	because	it	is	still	a	guideline	that	
the	Bolivian	national	government	should	attempt	to	adhere	to.		
	
D.	Managing	Revenues	
This	section	is	concerned	with	the	revenues	gained	from	natural	resource	extraction.	
Revenues	from	extraction	can	greatly	benefit	a	government	and	its	citizens	in	the	present	and	
the	future.	Additionally,	the	numerous	ways	in	which	revenues	can	be	allocated	present	a	state	
with	the	opportunity	or	perhaps	the	necessity	of	deciding	how	benefits	from	revenue	should	be	
distributed	and	to	who.	Here,	the	government	“should	consider	two	overriding	objectives:	
promotion	of	equity,	both	between	generations,	and	across	society;	and	efficient	use	of	
revenues	to	maximize	welfare.”174	Towards	the	first	point,	the	government	must	decide	how	
much	of	the	revenue	should	benefit	citizens	in	the	present,	and	how	much	should	be	invested	
for	future	generations.	Secondly,	a	government	may	also	decide	to	distribute	resource	
revenues	selectively	across	society	by	targeting	those	living	in	poverty,	those	living	in	
communities	nearer	to	extraction	sites,	or	to	specific	regions	of	the	state.175	Given	these	
objectives,	precept	seven	of	the	Natural	Resource	Charter	states	that	“the	government	should	
invest	revenues	to	achieve	optimal	and	equitable	outcomes,	for	current	and	future	
generations.”176	
The	Bolivian	state’s	management	of	natural	resource	revenues	can	be	observed	and	
analyzed	through	the	revenues	the	Bolivian	national	government	currently	earns	from	the	
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extraction	of	oil	and	gas.	In	2014,	the	oil	and	gas	sector	within	Bolivia	represented	8.7	percent	
of	its	GDP	and	55	percent	of	total	exports	and	the	sector	has	in	recent	years	contributed	to	
more	than	one	third	of	the	Treasury’s	income.177	Bolivia	has	a	strong	stake	in	the	hydrocarbon	
sector	through	its	“direct	tax	on	hydrocarbons	(Spanish	acronym,	IDH)”,	the	state	company,	
YPFB,	and	royalties.	The	hydrocarbons	sector	is	of	immense	importance	to	Bolivia’s	economy	
and	tax	regime.			
Bolivia	is	formed	into	nine	departments	which	in	total	contain	339	municipalities.	The	
government	has	allocated	significant	revenues	from	oil	and	gas	to	subnational	authorities;	In	
2011,	oil	and	gas	revenue	share	allocated	to	subnational	authorities	was	at	around	60	percent	
of	the	total	government	take.178	Departments	in	of	themselves	raise	very	little	source	revenue,	
and	their	revenue	consists	largely	of	inter-governmental	transfers	of	oil	and	gas	revenue	shared	
through	royalties	and	IDH.179	From	2005	to	2012,	IDH	and	royalties	represented	an	average	of	
78	percent	of	the	total	transfers	made	to	departments.	Bolivian	municipalities	also	rely	on	IDH	
revenue	as	well	since	they	raise	very	little	own-source	revenue.	From	2005	to	2012,	IDH	
revenue	represented	an	average	of	37	percent	of	total	transfers	to	municipalities.180	
Governments	at	the	departmental	level	within	Bolivia	“spend	the	larger	part	of	their	
hydrocarbon	revenue	in	transport	infrastructure	(roads	and	bridges),	while	municipal	
governments	tend	to	use	these	revenue	more	for	education,	health,	and	basic	sanitation.”181	
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Within	Bolivia,	the	law	“assigns	more	responsibilities	regarding	infrastructure	to	departments,	
while	social	services’	competencies	are	assigned	to	municipalities”.182	
	Revenue	from	the	Direct	Tax	on	Hydrocarbons	(IDH)	at	the	Departmental	and	Municipal	
levels	is	supposed	to	be	used	across	all	levels	of	society.	For	instance,	Departments’	prefectures	
should	spend	their	IDH	revenue	on	“economic	development:	roads,	rural	electrification,	
irrigation,	technical	assistance	and	training	of	the	private	sector”.183	IDH	revenue	is	also	
supposed	to	go	towards	“social	development:	infrastructure,	maintenance,	equipment,	and	
capacity	building	in	the	health	and	education	sectors”.184	Municipalities	should	spend	their	IDH	
revenue	on	education,	health,	local	economic	development	and	employment	promotion		and	
citizen	security	among	other	things.185	
Currently,	the	“location	of	extractive	projects	and	to	some	extent	population	are	the	
main	criteria	for	allocating	oil	and	gas	revenue	across	subnational	governments	in	Bolivia”,	but	
“this	redistribution	does	not	take	into	account	social	or	economic	characteristics	such	as	
Human	Development	Index	scores”.186	IDH	revenues	are	also	allocated	to	“universities,	
indigenous	groups,	elderly	population	through	the	Renta	Dignidad	fund,	school	students	
through	the	cash	transfer	Bono	Juancito	Pinto,	and	the	police	and	military	forces”.187		
The	Renta	Dignidad	scheme	in	particular	is	conceptualized	as	a	universal	pension	funded	
by	hydrocarbons.	It	is	described	by	the	Bolivian	Ministry	of	Autonomy	and	the	Bolivian	Ministry	
of	Economy	and	Public	Finance	as	being	“the	concrete	result	of	the	nationalization	of	our	
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natural	resources.	These	resources	now	go	directly	to	the	hands	of	those	who	most	need	them.	
It	is	a	sustainable	measure	that	does	not	represent	the	privatization	of	national	companies	nor	
the	loss	of	our	natural	wealth	and	patrimony.”188	While	labor	income	contributed	more	overall	
to	reducing	inequality	and	poverty	within	Bolivia	in	the	past	years,	there	is	evidence	that	non-
labor	income	benefited	their	specific	target	populations	like	the	elderly	(Renta	Dignidad).189			
This	suggests	that	the	government	of	Bolivia	has	allocated	its	hydrocarbon	revenue	
across	multiple	spectrums	of	society,	in	large	part	because	it	is	a	key	source	of	income	within	
the	tax	regime.	The	intentions	of	the	national	government	are	aimed	at	increasing	the	well-
being	of	its	citizens	through	social	programs	and	hydrocarbon	revenue	has	played	a	role	in	that.	
In	regards	to	lithium,	this	account	of	the	hydrocarbons	sector	suggests	that	the	government	has	
at	least	the	intention	to	prudently	allocate	any	revenue	from	a	lithium	mining	sector	into	
beneficial	social	programs	for	its	citizens	that	also	takes	into	account	benefiting	local	
communities.	The	next	precept	within	this	section	suggests	ways	in	which	revenue	volatilities	
can	be	avoided.	
	 Depending	on	the	extractive	industry,	future	revenues	from	a	natural	resource	can	be	
relatively	uncertain.	To	prevent	revenue	dependence	on	resource	extraction,	diversification	of	
the	economy	is	a	long-term	solution	to	this	problem.	Diversification	of	Bolivia’s	economy	will	be	
discussed	in	the	next	section.	However,	in	the	short	term,	another	strategy	is	to	“form	a	fund	
with	surplus	revenues	to	accumulate	foreign	assets	in	boom	times,	and	liquidate	those	assets	
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(or	borrow	if	these	are	insufficient)	when	revenues	fall.”190	Ultimately,	these	ideas	are	summed	
up	in	precept	eight	which	states	that	“the	government	should	smooth	domestic	spending	of	
revenues	to	account	for	revenue	volatility.”191	
	 	Bolivia	specifically	has	run	budget	surpluses	every	year	from	2006	to	2014,	and	this	has	
allowed	it	to	draw	down	the	public	sector’s	debt	and	to	build	up	its	international	reserves,	from	
$1.7	billion	in	2005	to	$15.1	billion	in	2014.192	This	growth	is	due	to	Bolivia	having	experienced	
a	boom	in	both	the	volume	of	its	gas	and	mining	exports	as	well	as	the	price	they	fetched	
abroad.	Export	revenues	in	the	decade	after	Evo	Morales	became	president	grew	from	$2.2	
billion	just	before	his	election	to	$12.9	billion	at	the	peak	of	the	boom.193	The	Bolivian	
government	is	currently	taking	advantage	of	the	economic	cushions	it	accumulated	during	the	
boom	to	contain	the	effects	of	current	low	commodity	prices.		
	 Again,	this	buildup	of	international	reserves	through	hydrocarbon	revenue	suggests	a	
prudent	macroeconomic	approach	by	the	national	government.	Here,	it	seems	that	Bolivia	took	
into	account	the	volatilities	of	the	hydrocarbon	sector.	Today,	it	is	using	its	reserves	to	mitigate	
the	effects	of	the	current	low	commodity	prices.	A	lithium	industry	within	Bolivia	and	any	
revenue	gained	from	such	would	hopefully	follow	the	same	paradigm	detailed	above	in	regards	
to	the	hydrocarbon	sector.	The	Bolivian	government	seems	to	have	met	these	precepts	in	
regards	to	the	management	of	revenues,	but	that	is	not	to	say	that	there	isn’t	room	for	
improvement.	This	section	suggests	that	Bolivia	has	recently	managed	its	revenues	from	natural	
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resource	extraction	well.	The	next	section	is	more	critical	in	regards	to	a	specific	aspect	of	
managing	revenues,	public	spending	and	investment.		
	
E.	Investing	for	Sustainable	Development	
	 This	section	again	looks	at	the	revenues	accrued	from	natural	resource	extraction,	but	in	
the	context	of	it	being	used	to	benefit	the	economy	and	to	particularly	mitigate	any	negative	
consequences	of	a	large	extractive	industry.	Effective	public	spending	management	here	can	be	
a	hedge	against	economic	decline.194	Resource	revenues,	as	presented	above,	have	given	
Bolivia	the	opportunity	to	undertake	and	increase	public	spending	programs	and	to	amass	large	
foreign	reserves.	Yet,	public	spending	and	effective	investment	can	be	challenging	particularly	
in	regards	to	diversifying	an	economy	away	from	extractive	industries.	In	regards	to	the	
effective	management	of	public	spending,	precept	nine	of	the	Natural	Resource	Charter	argues	
that	“the	government	should	use	revenues	as	an	opportunity	to	increase	the	efficiency	of	public	
spending	at	the	national	and	sub-national	levels.”195		
	 Currently,	the	Bolivian	government	faces	challenges	in	the	effective	management	of	
public	spending	programs	with	implications	for	its	current	hydrocarbon	industry	as	well	as	a	
future	lithium	industry.	The	overall	limited	administrative	capacity	of	Bolivia	has	resulted	in	an	
inability	to	effectively	develop	and	execute	programs.196	Additionally,	improving	the	efficiency	
of	social	spending	and	better	targeting	would	require	building	capacity	to	means	test	benefits,	
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introducing	more	competition	in	the	provision	of	social	services,	and	more	focus	on	
performance.197	The	process	to	build	this	capacity	is	ongoing.	For	instance,	the	national	
government	received	a	loan	from	the	Inter-American	Development	Bank	(IDB	in	2013)	for	$106	
million	to	improve	and	strengthen	mechanisms	for	effective,	efficient,	and	transparent	public	
expenditure.198	This	program	is	to	introduce,	among	other	things,	results-based	management	in	
central	government	agencies	by	means	of	performance	agreements	and	the	drafting	of	
multiyear	budgets	in	State-owned	enterprises	and	central	government	agencies.199	The	building	
of	this	administrative	capacity	is	an	ongoing	process	that	will	have	future	ramifications	for	the	
effective	spending	of	any	natural	resource	revenues.	In	regards	to	hydrocarbon	revenue	
sharing,	the	objectives	are	also	not	clearly	codified	and	there	are	no	available	studies	to	show	a	
direct	impact	of	revenue	sharing	on	socioeconomic	indicators,	such	as	poverty;	Additionally,	
“even	when	statutory	instruments	mandate	the	setting	of	objectives,	performance	indicators	
and	monitoring	and	evaluation	systems,	these	are	not	implemented	in	practice.”200	Overall,	
efficient	public	spending	in	Bolivia	is	specifically	challenged	by	a	lack	of	administrative	capacity.	
Hydrocarbon	revenue	sharing	also	suggests	that	the	state	lacks	clear	objectives	for	this	revenue	
and	the	ability	to	directly	measure	the	impacts	of	social	programs.	This	limited	ability	to	
effectively	implement	public	spending	programs	can	potentially	have	significant	effects	on	the	
government’s	ability	to	diversify	the	economy.	Bolivia,	in	particular,	has	unprecedented	
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reserves	from	its	hydrocarbon	revenue	but	the	state	is	still	facing	significant	challenges	
diversifying	the	economy	and	generating	job-driven	economic	growth.201		
	 A	key	role	of	the	government	in	the	governance	of	natural	resources	is	to	reduce	
negative	consequences	from	a	large	extractive	industry	on	the	economy,	as	explained	earlier.202	
The	proactive	use	of	natural	resource	revenues	can	grow	the	domestic	economy	through	
significant	increases	in	private	sector	investment,	but	“encouraging	sustained	growth	beyond	
resource	extraction	has	been	a	problem	for	many	resource-rich	countries.”203	The	
establishment	of	an	enabling	environment	for	private	investment	can	build	the	economy’s	
capacity	to	absorb	private	investment	and	to	lower	private	investment	costs.204	These	
observations	come	to	head	with	precept	ten	of	the	Natural	Resource	Charter,	which	states,	“the	
government	should	facilitate	private	sector	investments	to	diversify	the	economy	and	to	
engage	in	the	extractive	industry.”205	Here,	I	will	again	look	to	the	hydrocarbons	sector	and	the	
application	of	the	state’s	revenues	as	a	source	of	analysis.			
	 Between	2002	and	2014,	Bolivia	experienced	significant	economic	growth.	This	record	
growth	has	again	occurred	partially	because	of	high	commodity	prices	that	were	matched	with	
high	volumes	of	gas	exports	to	Brazil	and	Argentina.	Revenue	windfalls	due	to	gas	exports	
resulted	in	“an	increase	in	external	and	fiscal	savings	while	managing	to	stage	a	substantial	
fiscal	expansion.”206	Although	Bolivia	has	maintained	successful	economic	trends,	the	current	
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fall	in	commodity	prices	poses	a	challenge	for	the	country’s	economic	management.	The	
hydrocarbon	sector	accounts	for	almost	half	of	total	exports	and	one	third	of	fiscal	revenues	
and	lower	gas	prices	will	have	a	significant	negative	effect	on	fiscal	and	external	balances.207	
Bolivia	is	strongly	dependent	on	natural	resource	extraction	which	poses	significant	risks.	
Therefore,	there	is	a	need	to	develop	non-extractive	sectors	of	the	economy	so	that	
advancements	in	reducing	poverty	and	increasing	shared	prosperity	can	be	sustained.		
The	government	of	Bolivia	in	its	2016-2020	National	Economic	and	Social	Development	
Plan	hopes	to	maintain	growth	at	an	average	rate	of	5	percent	between	2016	and	2020	and	to	
reduce	extreme	poverty	from	17	percent	to	10	percent;	this	in	part	will	be	accomplished	
through	an	“extensive	public	investment	program	funded	in	part	by	savings	accumulated	during	
the	economic	boom,	Bolivian	Central	Bank	(CB)	loans	and	external	financing”.208	This	same	plan	
calls	for	increased	private	sector	activity	and	foreign	direct	investment	as	well	as	investments	in	
the	general	areas	of	infrastructure,	hydrocarbon	exploration,	industrialization	of	natural	gas	
(fertilizers	and	plastics)	and	hydroelectric	energy	generation.209	This	ambitious	development	
agenda	faces	structural	challenges	given	the	lack	of	administrative	capacity	to	effectively	
manage	these	projects.	Bolivia’s	efforts	to	diversify	the	economy	and	to	industrialize	the	
country	are	uncomplete,	and	development	of	a	lithium	extraction	industry	is	one	facet	of	
Bolivia’s	overall	plan	to	do	so.	The	narrative	above	suggests	that	perhaps	the	difficulties	Bolivia	
has	had	in	partnering	with	foreign	firms	and	beginning	the	industrial	production	of	lithium	may	
                                                
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/921771468186539912/pdf/100985-REVISED-OUO-9-R2015-
0221.pdf. 
207	Ibid.		
208	Bolivia	Overview."	The	World	Bank.	
209	Ibid.			
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in	part	be	due	to	a	lack	of	administrative	capacity	and	the	inability	to	implement	effective	
public	spending.		
	
F.	International	Foundations	for	Resource	Governance		
	 This	last	section	of	the	Natural	Resource	Charter	is	concerned	with	the	interaction	
between	private	sector	companies,	international	organizations,	and	governments	and	the	
standards	that	they	uphold.	For	example,	“governments	and	companies	should	fully	account	for	
the	rights	of	indigenous	peoples”	and,	“where	free,	prior	and	informed	consent	to	extraction	is	
required	by	law,	companies	must	obtain	consent	ahead	of	any	work	taking	place	on	indigenous	
lands,	and	should	furthermore	meaningfully	engage	and	consult	with	local	communities	that	
may	be	significantly	affected	by	extractive	operations.”210	In	all,	precept	eleven	states,	
“companies	should	commit	to	the	highest	environmental,	social	and	human	rights	standards,	
and	to	sustainable	development.”211	I	will	first	discuss	this	precept	in	terms	of	K-UTEC	and	then	
will	move	on	to	Bolivia’s	nationalized	lithium	company.		
It	is	difficult	to	ascertain	here	what	environmental	standards	K-UTEC	Ag	Salt	
Technologies	will	uphold.	The	company	is	only	going	so	far	as	to	design	the	lithium	production	
process,	as	mentioned	earlier.	The	director	of	the	company,	Heiner	Marx	has	said	that	“we	
evaporate	only	the	brine	from	the	Salar,	not	the	drinking	water	from	the	communities	
around”.212	At	minimum,	there	is	at	least	a	recognition	on	the	part	of	K-UTEC	Ag	Salt	
                                                
210	Natural	Resource	Charter.	
211	Ibid.	
212	Opray,	Max.	"Electric	car	boom	fuels	interest	in	Bolivia's	fragile	salt	flats."	January	17,	2017.	
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2017/jan/17/white-gold-companies-search-lithium-bolivia. 
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Technologies	that	they	will	attempt	to	avoid	affecting	the	drinking	water	of	local	communities.	
Given	the	generally	secretive	nature	of	natural	resource	extraction,	and	thus	little	information	
on	the	process	K-UTEC	is	designing,	it	is	impossible	to	say	what	standards	they	are	upholding.	
The	largest	concerns	here	are	once	Bolivia	finds	a	foreign	firm	for	the	industrial	production	of	
lithium.	These	standards	will	then	be	incredibly	relevant.	Since	the	actual	state	of	this	project	is	
in	flux	and	is	quite	amorphous,	it	is	difficult	to	apply	the	Natural	Resource	Charter	here	to	K-
UTEC	other	than	to	say	that	this	standard	should	be	applied	in	the	future.			
	 The	commitment	to	environmental,	social	and	human	rights	standards	is	most	
worrisome	here	in	regards	to	the	conduct	of	the	state	of	Bolivia.	As	shown	earlier,	despite	free,	
prior	and	informed	consent	to	extraction	for	indigenous	peoples	being	codified	within	Bolivia’s	
constitution,	the	actual	practice	of	consultation	to	date	has	not	followed	these	standards.	The	
conflict	exists	partially	because	the	company	doing	the	consultation	is	owned	by	the	state	
government.	Outside	of	indigenous	rights,	it	is	also	clear	that	Bolivia	doesn’t	uphold	certain	
standards.	As	stated	earlier,	the	Bolivian	national	government	faces	particular	difficulties	when	
concerning	environmental	standards.	The	Bolivian	national	government	still	has	much	to	do	in	
terms	of	enforcing	codified	rights	and	towards	upholding	institutionalized	standards.	The	next	
precept	in	this	section	discusses	how	international	organizations	can	help	affect	ongoing	
natural	resource	governance.			
	 Precept	twelve	states,	“governments	and	international	organizations	should	promote	an	
upward	harmonization	of	standards	to	support	sustainable	development.”213	This	precept	is	
difficult	to	apply	as	it	is	a	suggestion	for	how	international	organizations	can	influence	countries	
                                                
213	Natural	Resource	Charter.	
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like	Bolivia.	It	is	a	best	practice	that	concerns	the	entire	international	community.	In	a	sense,	
the	Natural	Resource	Charter	is	part	of	this	ongoing	harmonization	of	standards	as	it	suggests	
normative	guidelines	and	best	practices	for	natural	resource	extraction.	Bolivia’s	involvement	
with	international	organizations	like	the	United	Nations	can	promote	this	upward	
harmonization	by	helping	to	build	the	capacity	of	the	government,	the	legislature,	the	media	
and	civil	society	in	these	respective	countries.214		
This	ends	the	discussion	of	how	the	Natural	Resource	Charter	might	be	applied	in	
Bolivia.	Throughout	this	section,	I	have	identified	problems	or	challenges	that	Bolivia	faces	in	
regards	to	its	lithium	project.	I	have	also	identified	positive	actions	the	Bolivian	national	
government	has	taken.	The	next	section	is	the	conclusion	of	this	thesis	and	it	will	sum	both	the	
negative	and	positive	actions	of	the	Bolivian	national	government	while	also	offering	
recommendations.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
                                                
214	Ibid.	
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V.	Recommendations		
The	application	of	the	Natural	Resource	Charter	to	Bolivia	and	its	lithium	deposits	
complicates	this	dream	of	lithium,	and	indicates	as	well	that	the	national	government’s	ability	
to	govern	this	natural	resource	to	these	standards	is	not	possible	at	this	time.	However,	this	
doesn’t	suggest	that	the	state	couldn’t	manage	the	extraction	of	lithium	to	some	degree	or	will	
undermine	this	project	to	the	point	that	it	isn’t	beneficial.	Rather	it	suggests	ways	that	the	
Bolivian	national	government	can	improve	its	natural	resource	governance.	In	this	section,	I	will	
lay	out	these	challenges	and	ways	in	which	they	can	possibly	be	mitigated	or	resolved.	Some	of	
these	challenges,	such	as	improving	the	administrative	capacity	of	the	Bolivian	national	
government,	could	have	their	own	respective	theses.	I	have	grouped	these	challenges	into	
broad	overarching	themes	that	are	more	a	narrative	than	a	point	by	point	analysis.		
First,	a	large	concern	that	exists	for	this	project	is	how	the	Bolivian	national	government	
sees	it	in	context	of	the	overall	economy.	As	described	earlier,	Bolivia	operates	within	a	
neoextractivist	framework	where	the	state	relies	heavily	on	its	hydrocarbons	sector	for	its	
economy,	the	wellbeing	of	its	citizens,	and	for	its	fiscal	regime.	This	dream	of	lithium	as	
evidenced	by	state	rhetoric	falls	within	this	same	framework.	However,	while	the	Bolivian	
government	has	benefited	in	the	past	from	this	neoextractivist	developmental	model,	lower	
commodity	prices	threaten	its	longevity.	This	is	recognized	by	the	state	government	as	well.	I	
would	be	particularly	concerned	if	the	Bolivian	national	government	maintains	or	sees	lithium	
as	a	future	analog	to	its	hydrocarbon	sector,	rather	than	as	an	opportunity	to	diversify	the	
economy	in	general.	The	extraction	of	lithium	at	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	could	possibly	be	a	
significant	opportunity,	but	the	state	shouldn’t	conceive	of	it	as	the	sole	option	to	diversify	the	
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economy	and	to	bring	in	private	investment.	The	state	should	maintain	an	accurate	
understanding	of	its	lithium	base	and	should	seek	to	find	appropriate	terms	with	foreign	
partners	so	that	it	does	not	stunt	the	potential	of	this	industry.	Rather	than	clouding	this	
resource	with	ambition	and	rhetoric,	an	accurate	and	clear	projection	of	the	Salar	de	Uyuni’s	
resources	may	help	the	Bolivian	state	accomplish	its	goals,	while	also	presenting	transparent	
information	to	its	citizens.	In	all,	Bolivia	should	see	the	production	of	lithium	an	opportunity	to	
further	diversify	the	economy	in	light	of	its	dependence	on	hydrocarbons.		
Another	broad	issue	concerning	this	project	is	corruption	and	the	actual	implementation	
of	the	Bolivian	legal	framework	by	its	institutions.	Widespread	corruption	within	the	Bolivian	
state	could	affect	its	ability	to	properly	manage	its	lithium	deposits.	Secondly,	neoextractivism	
has	taken	precedence	over	the	rights	afforded	to	indigenous	groups	and	stipulations	regarding	
water	and	the	environment.	For	instance,	despite	a	framework	of	rights	codified	to	indigenous	
peoples	within	Bolivia’s	constitution,	like	the	right	to	prior	obligatory	consultation,	the	actual	
upholding	of	these	rights	does	not	occur	to	the	degree	that	they	should.	This	not	only	
undermines	Bolivia’s	legal	framework,	but	conflicts	between	indigenous	groups	or	local	peoples	
and	the	national	government	could	occur	in	the	future	because	they	weren’t	consulted	prior	to	
the	implementation	of	this	lithium	project.	This	observation	leads	to	more	narrow	challenges	
that	are	specific	to	this	lithium	project	and	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	region.		
The	Bolivian	national	government	should	rethink	its	national	strategy	if	it	has	not	
already	done	so.	Since	the	project	is	significantly	behind	schedule,	a	new	roadmap	that	is	
realistic	could	help	the	government	effectively	govern	this	resource.	However,	a	national	
strategy	that	is	comprehensive	also	means	that	the	state	should	take	into	account	the	
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detrimental	externalities	of	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	that	could	affect	the	state’s	ability	to	
industrialize	its	lithium	resource.	Simply	put,	the	state	should	not	push	ahead	to	the	industrial	
production	of	lithium	without	ensuring	that	its	process	for	doing	so	is	profitable	in	the	context	
of	the	larger	marketplace.	Given	that	the	state	has	at	times	not	conducted	public	spending	
programs	effectively,	this	could	be	a	real	concern.	There	are	various	accounts	or	speculations	
about	the	Salar	de	Uyuni’s	value,	so	it	is	difficult	to	say	if	this	will	become	in	monetary	terms	a	
great	benefit.	Corporations	that	are	looking	to	extract	lithium	or	need	it	may	look	to	other	
countries,	like	Chile	or	Argentina.	Another	issue	within	constructing	a	viable	and	beneficial	
national	strategy	for	this	lithium	project	is	that	of	consultation.		
For	instance,	the	Bolivian	government	maintains	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	as	a	fiscal	reserve,	
but	the	boundaries	of	this	reserve	are	opaque.	This	could	become	a	source	of	conflict	for	the	
various	communities	in	the	area	and	the	state.	The	state	here	should	consult	with	the	local	
communities	to	make	clear	these	differing	accounts	of	territory.	The	Bolivian	government	
should	also	strive	to	engage	and	involve	all	of	the	various	groups	and	individuals	of	the	Salar	de	
Uyuni	region.	Politicizing	consultation	and	not	addressing	concerns	now	may	lead	to	conflict	in	
the	future	or	affect	the	state’s	ability	to	best	implement	the	industrial	production	of	lithium.	I	
am	particularly	concerned	that	the	Bolivian	state	has	not	taken	the	appropriate	steps	to	
determine	the	extent	to	which	the	lithium	project	will	affect	the	environment,	particularly	local	
water	resources.	This	could	severely	impact	local	quinoa	farmers	whose	livelihood	is	intimately	
attached	to	this	resource	within	this	ecosystem.	Effects	to	tourism	and	quinoa	production	must	
be	mitigated	as	the	local	communities	and	individuals	could	have	their	livelihoods	rendered	
unsustainable	if	local	water	resources	are	effected	severely.	However,	their	concerns	may	be	
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ignored	in	light	of	neoextractivism;	this	is	again	a	recurring	challenge	or	theme	for	the	Bolivian	
government.	The	national	government’s	prioritization	of	natural	resources	comes	into	conflict	
with	its	own	legal	standards	as	well	as	the	ones	that	the	Natural	Resource	Charter	suggest.		
Finally,	as	shown	by	the	analysis	of	hydrocarbon	revenues,	the	Bolivian	national	
government’s	intentions	towards	uplifting	the	well-being	of	its	citizens	is	apparent.	
Hydrocarbon	revenues	are	intrinsic	to	the	functioning	of	subnational	governments	and	citizens	
have	likely	improved	from	the	state’s	social	services	programs.	This	idea	is	one	of	many	that	are	
present	in	its	neoextractivist	framework.	Its	allocation	of	revenues	could	be	improved	in	the	
case	of	a	lithium	project.	The	national	government	should	consult	with	local	communities	to	
balance	or	determine	the	allocation	of	revenues	given	to	the	Potosí	Department.	Since	the	
extraction	of	lithium	would	by	necessity	affect	them	the	most,	negative	ramifications	could	be	
partly	mitigated	by	earmarking	an	appropriate	amount	of	the	revenue	for	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	
region.	Given	the	poverty	present	here,	this	could	be	an	opportunity	for	the	national	
government	to	conduct	effective	social	programs	that	fall	in	line	with	their	stated	goals.		
The	state	should	also	look	to	better	target	its	citizens	living	in	extreme	poverty	and	
should	also	implement	studies	to	better	measure	the	impact	of	its	revenue	sharing	and	social	
programs	on	socioeconomic	indicators.	This	would	facilitate,	in	the	future,	more	effective	public	
spending.	This	implementation	is	dependent	on	building	the	administrative	and	institutional	
capacity	of	the	Bolivian	national	government,	and	this	again	remains	a	recurring	theme	for	
effective	natural	resource	governance	within	this	country.	The	Bolivian	national	government	
has	managed	its	economy	very	well	recently,	but	it	faces	challenges	in	the	future	because	of	
low	commodity	prices.	The	state	seems	to	be	on	the	right	approach	towards	diversifying	its	
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economy	to	alleviate	the	ramifications	of	low	commodity	prices.	It	has	also	maintained	strong	
fiscal	reserves	that	allow	it	to	alleviate	this	current	dilemma.	This	suggests	that	the	Bolivian	
national	government	can	manage	lithium	well	in	terms	of	revenues,	although	it	could	do	so	
more	effectively.		
Given	these	challenges,	and	in	line	with	the	last	section	of	the	application	stage,	the	
Bolivian	national	government	should	strive	to	meet	these	challenges	and	properly	account	for	
them.	I	am	however	skeptical	that	they	will,	given	this	neoextractivist	framework	that	the	
country	operates	through	as	well	as	problems	concerning	its	institutions,	like	corruption.	
Bolivia’s	civil	society,	its	media	and	its	non-governmental	organizations,	as	well	as	the	people	
living	around	the	Salar	could	check	or	influence	the	government’	behavior	towards	any	possible	
mismanagement	of	this	resource.	While	there	at	times	there	has	been	opposition	from	the	
state	against	these	organizations,	they	still	remain	as	a	tool	to	uphold	indigenous	rights	or	
reveal	issues	with	the	use	of	water	among	other	concerns.	International	organizations	like	the	
United	Nations	could	also	facilitate	the	Bolivian	state’s	ability	to	meet	these	standards	and	
challenges.		
The	national	government	of	Bolivia	has	the	capacity	to	realize	this	lithium	project	but	it	
may	not	have	the	capacity	or	the	intention	to	manage	it	beneficially	in	the	light	of	other	
stakeholders	and	the	concerns	laid	out	above.	There	are	particular	concerns	the	state	should	
overcome	and	it	may	do	so.	In	its	present	incarnation,	the	extraction	of	lithium	in	Bolivia	is	best	
described	as	hopeful.	People	are	hopeful	that	climate	change	can	be	mitigated	and	that	electric	
cars	will	become	increasingly	widespread.	The	companies	that	manufacture	electric	cars,	
lithium-ion	batteries,	and	extract	lithium	are	hopeful	that	this	becomes	the	case	too.	Bolivia	is	
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hopeful	that	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	becomes	a	valuable	resource	that	can	be	used	to	improve	the	
economy	and	to	uplift	its	citizens,	and	the	people	around	the	Salar	de	Uyuni	and	I	myself	hope	
that	the	state	can	manage	it	effectively.	Given	these	hopes	and	their	role	in	realizing	a	larger	
goal	of	mitigating	climate	change,	it	is	best	that	we	remain	cognizant	of	the	effects	a	shift	to	
electric	cars	entails.	Natural	resource	extraction,	particularly	that	of	oil	and	gas	and	now	
lithium,	has	consequences.	While	the	introduction	of	an	overall	more	beneficial	manifestation	
of	the	automobile	is	increasingly	possible,	we	should	be	aware	of	what	it	entails	in	its	entirety.	
It	remains	to	be	seen	whether	electric	cars	will	takeoff	and	whether	the	effects	of	this	takeoff	
will	distinctly	impact	Bolivia,	but	this	possibility	is	something	I	am	hopeful	that	one	day	the	
state	can	manage	beneficially.			
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